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INTRODUCTION
As money, fugitives, and contraband cross national and political
boundaries, attempts to resolve criminal matters have taken on an
international character.' In response to this trend, the United States
1. See Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, The Sheinbein Case
and the Israeli-American Extradition Experience: A Need for Compromise, 32
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305, 326-27 (1999) (discussing the growing nature of
international criminal drug trafficking and incidences involving foreign fugitives).
Crimes such as drug trafficking have forced governments to rethink the need for
international cooperation in criminal matters. See MALCOLM ANDERSON, POLICING
THE WORLD, INTERPOL AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE
COOPERATION 27 (1989). Organized crime has also become an international phe-
nomenon because members of international organizations hail from many coun-
tries, and both money and contraband move across international borders. See
Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra, at 339. Additionally, money laundering has
emerged as an international crime "through a combination of globalized financial
markets, electronic transfer networks, easy access to them through financial ha-
vens, and some countries' laws on banking secrecy." See Ian Hamilton Fazey,
Fighting Money Laundering (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http: 193.123.144.44/interpol.
com/keynote/UNDCPmoney.htm>. While private individuals were previously the
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has turned to other countries for assistance in seeking justice: Israel,
for example, agreed to assist the United States in pursuing and extra-
diting fugitives. Much to the disappointment of U.S. officials, how-
most frequent targets of criminals, now, with the arrival of certain technological
advances, criminals pose a greater threat to communities and governments as a
whole. See MICHAEL FOONER, INTERPOL: ISSUES IN WORLD CRIME AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 209 (1989). The Office of International Affairs
of the Department of Justice is largely responsible for the increased United States
awareness of international criminal activity. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Evolu-
tion of United States Involvement in the International Rendition of Fugitive Crimi-
nals, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 813, 818-20 (1993). International organizations
such as Interpol also play an integral role in international cooperation by develop-
ing information technology, increasing the level of cooperation between different
police forces, and ensuring the dissemination of vital information. See Qlice of
Int'l Crimzinal Justice Online: Interpol Expands Services in Global fl'ar on Crime
(visited Dec. 5, 1999) <www.acsp.uic.edu///oijc/pubs/cje/060409 _2.htm>.
2. See Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporar" Practice of the United States Re-
lating to International Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 44, 44-47 (1998) (stating that the
purpose of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Extradition Treaties is to
improve the United States' ability to pursue foreign offenders); see also Abraham
Abramovsky, Partners Against Crime: Joint Prosecutions of Israeli Organized
Crime Figures by U.S. and Israeli Authorities, 19 FORDHIAM INT'L L.J. 1903, 1904
(1996) (analyzing United States' attempts to work with Israeli officials in prose-
cuting the Israeli Mafia).
3. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 585 (6th ed. 1990) (defining extradition as
the "surrender by one state or country to another of an individual accused or con-
victed of an offense outside its own territory and within the territorial jurisdiction
of the other, which, being competent to try and punish him, demands the surren-
der."); see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED
STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (1996) (providing a general historical introduction
behind extradition). Bassiouni considers extradition to be "a system consisting of
several processes whereby one sovereign surrenders to another sovereign a person
sought as an accused criminal or fugitive offender." Id.; Extradition Convention,
Dec. 10, 1962, U.S.-Isr., 14 U.S.T. 1707, art. II, corrected version in 18 U.S.T. 382
(1967) (establishing the agreement between the United States and Israel in which
the two countries agreed to extradite nationals); Treaty with Israel on Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 26, 1998, U.S.-Isr., S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-
40 (1998) (facilitating joint cooperation by providing a non-exclusive list of types
of mutual assistance, such as locating or identifying persons and transfemng per-
sons in custody for testimony); Sari Bashi, Man Fighting Ertradition to U.S., AP
ONLINE, Mar. 7, 1999, available in 1999 WL 13836102 (discussing the case of
Chaim Berger, an American citizen fighting extradition to Israel for charges of
fraud and embezzlement); Dina Kraft, After Sheinbein, Parliament Approves New
Extradition Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES. Apr. 19, 1999, at 2, available in
WL, MDNEWS File (providing some of the more famous and recent examples of
extradition between the United States and Israel). There are many additional ex-
amples of United States-Israeli cooperation in which United States officials aided
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ever, the Israeli Supreme Court recently refused to aid the United
States in granting the extradition of Samuel Sheinbein,' a Maryland
teenager accused of committing one of the most gruesome and vio-
lent murders in recent memory As a result of this decision Shein-
bein will serve his sentence in a foreign country, even though he was
raised as an American 7 and his crime took place on American soil.
Israel, however, recently amended its extradition law in response
to the Sheinbein decision. By establishing that non-residents will
face extradition, the new legislation addresses situations, such as
Sheinbein's, where a non-resident Israeli citizen seeks refuge under
Israel's extradition laws.9 Although this legislative change is a posi-
the Israeli government in prosecuting criminals in Israel. See Abramovsky, supra
note 1, at 1903. For instance, law enforcement officials cooperated in prosecuting
Israel Mizrahi and Joseph Reisch. See id. The trials of Isaac Kirman, Nadav Na-
kan, and Yair Orr also illustrate the development of United States-Israeli joint co-
operation. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 314-15. Further, officials
in Israel and the United States cooperated in prosecuting a fugitive who committed
murder in California, and fled to Israel to seek refuge from a United States sen-
tence mandating life in prison without parole. See Today: Profile: Maryland State
Prosecutor John McCarthy Discusses Case of American Samuel Sheinbein, Who
Will be Tried in Israel (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 26, 1999) [hereinafter
Matyland State Prosecutor] (detailing this earlier bilateral cooperation).
4. See Dan Izenberg, Court: Murder Suspect Can 't Be Extradited, JERUSALEM
POST, Feb. 26, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 8999990 (discussing the ruling of
the Israeli Supreme Court, which applied an amendment to the Extradition Con-
vention preventing the extradition of Israeli citizens).
5. See Eddie Dean, Blood Buddies, WASH. CITY PAPER, May 8, 1998
<http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com.. .es/cover/1998/printcover0508.html>
(detailing the grisly murder). Samuel Sheinbein and his friend, Aaron Needle, al-
legedly dismembered and burned the victim's remains. See id.
6. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 320-21 (stating that Israel
will handle the Sheinbein case and apply Israeli domestic law).
7. See Dafna Linzer, Israeli Court Rejects Extradition, AP ONLINE, Mar. 2 1,
1999, available in 1999 WL 14513111 (noting that Sheinbein was born and raised
in the United States). Even if Sheinbein did possess American citizenship status,
this would not necessarily preclude him from acquiring Israeli citizenship upon his
return to Israel. See infra note 62 (discussing the way in which Israeli law actually
enables someone to maintain dual citizenship).
8. See Kraft, supra note 3, at 2 (reporting that the Israeli Parliament, the
Knesset, chose to repeal its extradition law in the wake of the Sheinbein ruling to
prevent foreign criminals from taking advantage of Israeli laws and using the
country as a safe haven).
9. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text (discussing how Israel
[15:667
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five step in remedying some of the problems that accompany the
non-extradition of nationals,' the legacy of Samuel Sheinbein re-
mains. Many Americans are concerned with Israel's recent actions
due, in large part, to Sheinbein's evasion of a harsher sentence under
United States law." Moreover, the Sheinbein example presents yet
another instance of a nation refusing to cooperate in the resolution of
an international criminal matter.'
2
This Comment utilizes the Sheinbein case to highlight some of the
more pressing and perplexing issues in international criminal extra-
dition. First, this Comment asserts that, despite the legal and policy
arguments in support of Israel's refusal to grant extradition, the Is-
raeli decision to deny extradition relies on dubious citizenship claims
and fails to serve the United States' punitive interests. Second, this
Comment contends that cultural, humanitarian, and foreign policy
considerations figured prominently in both Israel's ruling and the
change in its extradition law. Finally, this Comment argues that, al-
though flawed, the recent change in Israeli extradition law serves as a
model for nations refusing to extradite their nationals.
Part I provides a history of the Sheinbein case, including possible
reasons why Israel failed to grant extradition. Part II analyzes Israel's
reasons for refusing extradition, noting other extradition precedents
and their applicability to the Israeli Supreme Court's ruling. Part III
presents an assessment of additional factors regarding Israeli extra-
dition law and the application of such factors to the Sheinbein case.
Part IV discusses how the denial of extradition affects certain sen-
tencing issues in the Sheinbein case, and how Sheinbein's presence
in Israel would, hypothetically, increase the difficulty of conducting
amended its extradition law to prevent situations similar to Sheinbein's). The new
law provides that Israeli non-resident citizens will face extradition, whereas Israeli
residents will face a trial abroad and serve their sentence at home. See Kraft, supra
note 3, at 2.
10. See infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text (providing reasons why the
new legislation is better equipped to handle situations in which non-residents at-
tempt to hide behind a nation's extradition laws).
11. See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text (asserting that Sheinbein
will likely receive a lighter sentence under Israeli law).
12. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (providing an assessment of
Israel's decision to deny the United States' extradition request and cooperate with
Maryland prosecutors in resolving the matter).
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a trial. Part V analyzes both the benefits and problems that accom-
pany the new Israeli extradition legislation. Finally, this Comment
concludes that, although Israel's change in extradition law deserves
praise, the troubling legacy of Sheinbein still plagues the interna-
tional community.
I. HISTORY OF THE SHEINBEIN CASE AND
ISRAEL'S REASONS FOR REFUSING
EXTRADITION
On September 16, 1997, in the Washington, D.C. suburb of Aspen
Hill, Maryland, Samuel Sheinbein and Aaron Needle, both seventeen
years old, choked, stabbed, and beat Alfredo (Freddy) Enrique Tello,
Jr. to death." Three days later, police discovered the charred and
dismembered body of the victim in a garage near Sheinbein's home.'
4
When the police found Tello's body, they already had strong evi-
dence indicating that Sheinbein and Needle committed the murder."
Law enforcement officials, however, could not pinpoint a precise
13. See Dean, supra note 5 (describing the time, place, and circumstances of
Tello's murder); see also Lee Hockstader & Craig Whitlock, Sheinbein Sentenced
to 24 Years, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1999, at BI, available in 1999 WL 23310939
(noting the Israeli Court's reaction to the "cruelty, wickedness and malice" of the
murder). After murdering Tello, Sheinbein and Needle severed his arms and legs,
and burned his torso and head. See Dean, supra note 5; Steve Vogel & Thomas W.
Lippman, Death Caused by Cuts, Blows, Strangulation; Claim of Self-Defense
Could Be Undermined, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1997, at A19, available in 1997 WL
14706277 (setting forth the gruesome details of the murder).
14. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 306 (describing the condi-
tion in which authorities discovered Tello's body).
15. See ABC 20/20: Accused Teen Killer's Flight to Israel (ABC television
broadcast, June 30, 1999) [hereinafter Flight to Israel] (indicating that a trail of
blood drops from the victim to Sheinbein's home provided the initial link between
the body and the two youths). Investigators also detected a bloodstain on Shein-
bein's garage floor. See id. Furthermore, police discovered next to the victim a cir-
cular saw that Sheinbein had allegedly purchased. See id. Investigators also found
receipts of several items-such as a stun gun, knife, blindfolds, gags, handcuffs,
and legcuffs-used by Sheinbein to incapacitate and murder Tello. See id. Neigh-
bors even witnessed Sheinbein and Needle pushing a tarp-covered cart near Shein-
bein's home. See Herb Keinon, Fit to be Tried: But Where?, JERUSALEM POST,
Oct. 17, 1997, at 11, available in LEXIS, Israel Country Information File.
[15:667
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motive. 6 While officials suspected that Needle was upset with Tello
over a woman, they believed Sheinbein committed the murder for
pure excitement. 7 Sheinbein and Needle, however, fled to New York
City before officials could question them.'" Once in New York,
Sheinbein obtained an Israeli passport with the help of his father,
Sol, and flew to Israel.' 9
Upon Sheinbein's arrival in Tel Aviv, Israeli authorities detained
him20 took him into custody, and awaited an extradition request from
the United States.2 ' Although the United States wished to extradite
Sheinbein to stand trial for murder in Maryland, Israeli officials felt
compelled to keep him within their own borders based on a 1978 law
that forbade the extradition of Israeli citizens.2" Sheinbein obtained
16. See CBS This Morning: State's Attorney Doug Gansler Discusses Case Re-
garding Samuel Sheinbein and the Court in Israel, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, CBSNew File (CBS television broadcast, Aug. 25, 1999) [hereinafter CBS]
(providing possible motives behind the murder of Tello).
17. See id. (offering State's Attorney Douglas Gansler's opinion that Shein-
bein's motive for the murder was the sheer thrill of killing); see also Flight to Is-
rael, supra note 15 (suggesting that Sheinbein was in a "thrill-kill mode").
18. See Dean, supra note 5 (detailing the suspects' attempt to escape authori-
ties).
19. See id. (reporting that, while Sheinbein received assistance from his father
to fly to Israel, Needle returned to Washington where he was arrested). Authorities
later charged Sheinbein's father with obstructing a police investigation in connec-
tion with the aid he gave his son. See Hockstader & Whitlock, supra note 13, at BI
(stating that criminal charges are still pending in Maryland against Sol Sheinbein).
Because Sol Sheinbein committed a misdemeanor, however, United States officials
are unable to prosecute him unless he returns to the United States. See id. None-
theless, Sol Sheinbein may be disbarred from practicing law in the United States,
where he was once a patent and trademark lawyer. See id. In response, Sol Shein-
bein claims that he prevented his son from committing suicide by helping him flee
to Israel. See Flight to Israel, supra note 15. Samuel Sheinbein, in fact, did attempt
suicide by swallowing sleeping pills. See id. Meanwhile, Aaron Needle, Shein-
bein's accomplice, was successful in his attempt to take his own life on the eve of
his trial. See id.
20. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 306 (discussing the course
of events that took place once Sheinbein arrived in Israel). Israeli authorities de-
tained Sheinbein after his admission to a hospital following his suicide attempt.
See Flight to Israel, supra note 15.
21. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 306 (providing details on the
way Israeli authorities handled Sheinbein once he arrived in Israel).
22. See Penal Act (Offenses Committed Abroad [Amendment of Enactments]
2000] 3
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refuge as an Israeli citizen through an Israeli nationality law that ac-
corded him the benefits of his father's citizenship.23 This law
shielded him from United States prosecution despite a 1962 Extradi-
tion Treaty between Israel and the United States24 and a long history
of cooperation between the two nations." Meanwhile, United States
law enforcement officials and political figures became increasingly
frustrated with Israel's willingness to provide refuge for the youth.2
This criticism gave rise to growing United States-Israeli tensions."
Act), sec. 2, 1978, 32 L.S.I. 63 (1978) (establishing that Israel will not extradite
individuals who are Israeli citizens when they commit a crime); see also Abramov-
sky, supra note 2, at 1908 (referencing the 1978 law); Abramovsky & Edelstein,
supra note 1, at 306 (discussing the Israeli extradition law); Sheryl Petkunas, The
United States, Israel, and Their Extradition Dilemma, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 204,
204 (1990) (describing Israel's inability to adhere to the United States-Israel Ex-
tradition Treaty due to Israeli legislation prohibiting the extradition of nationals).
Former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin passed the legislation fearing that
countries would attempt to extradite Israeli citizens in the wake of the Holocaust.
See infra note 130 and accompanying text (addressing the historical reasons for
passing the anti-extradition law); Liat Collins, MKs Favor Allowing Extradition of
Citizens, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 3, 1998, at 6, available in LEXIS, Israel Country
Information File (providing background on the 1978 law, and developments in the
law's application that led to international pressure for new legislation).
23. See Thomas W. Lippman & Barton Gellman, Israel Still Seeks Legal Way
to Return Suspect to U.S., WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1997, at B1, available in 1997 WL
14706119 (explaining that Sheinbein could be an Israeli citizen if the court found
that his father retained his Israeli citizenship while living in the United States); see
also Acquisition of Israeli Nationality (visited June 12, 1999) <http://israel.org/
mfa/go.asp?MFAH00mz0> [hereinafter Israeli Nationality] (discussing the Law of
Return, which grants a "Jew" the right to return to Israel and become an Israeli
citizen if he or she is a child or grandchild of a Jewish person). Sol Sheinbein
claimed Israeli citizenship based on his birth in British-ruled Palestine in 1944. See
Lippman & Gellman, supra. United States officials attempted to discredit these
claims through affidavits demonstrating that the Sheinbein family intended to re-
nounce their Israeli citizenship. See id.
24. See Extradition Convention, supra note 3, arts. I & IV, 14 U.S.T. at 1708,
1710 (requiring each country to extradite criminals found within its territory and
prohibiting a country from refusing to extradite a national).
25. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing the relationship be-
tween the United States and Israel with respect to resolving criminal matters).
26. See infra notes 28-38 and accompanying text (detailing the United States'
reaction to Israel's refusal to grant extradition); see also Abramovsky & Edelstein,
supra note I, at 307 (expressing frustration and anger on the part of Maryland
prosecutor Robert Dean and former Louisiana Representative Robert Livingston).
27. See J.J. Goldberg, The Sixth Borough: Testing A Strong Friendship; Will
Case of Fugitive Murder Suspect Fray Ties Between Israel and the U.S.?, JEWISH
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The matter seemingly reached a conclusion on September 6, 1998,
when a lower Israeli court held that Israel must extradite Sheinbein
to the United States." Problems for United States-Israeli relations,-"
however, remained due to the Israeli Supreme Court's ability to hear
the case on appeal. 0 This appeal proved detrimental to the United
States' interests when the Israeli high court ruled that the country
could not extradite Sheinbein to the United States." In a split deci-
WEEK, Oct. 10, 1997, at 14, available in 1997 WL 11662308 (describing the way
in which Israel's position angered United States officials). Members of Congress
threatened to cut $500 million of aid to Israel because of its failure to extradite
Sheinbein. See id. Ironically, even Israeli leaders tried to get around their laws in
order to help the United States achieve its objectives. See id. For example, Israeli
officials attempted to dismiss the case from court on technicalities, such as annul-
ling the father's citizenship. See id.
28. See Lee Hockstader, Judge Says Israel Can Ertradite Sheinbein; Appeal of
Ruling May Take Months, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1998, at Al, available in 1998
WL 16554468 (discussing Jerusalem District Court Judge Moshe Ravid's ruling
that Israel may extradite Sheinbein to stand trial for first-degree murder in the
United States). Although the judge conceded that Sheinbein could be a citizen of
Israel, he did not believe that the suspect had sufficient connections with the coun-
try, thereby making Sheinbein's citizenship devoid of all meaning. See id. Judge
Ravid specifically noted that Sheinbein was born and raised in the United States,
and had never lived in Israel. See id. On a broader level, Judge Ravid also reasoned
that to rule otherwise would mean other nations would not honor their extradition
agreements with Israel. See Ann LoLordo et al., Judge OKs Ertradition ftor Shein-
bein: Decision Means Teen Would Return to U.S. to Face Murder Charge; 'The
Trip is Almost Over, Teen Fled to Israel after 1997 Killing of Man, 19, in Whea-
ton, BALT. SUN, Sept. 7, 1998, at lB, available in 1998 WL 4983411.
29. See Tamara Lush, Slaying Creates Diplomatic Tangle: U.S., Israel Still
Grappling Over Md. Teen, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 1998, at 3A, available in 1998
W'L 5716318 (commenting on the strong ties between Israel and the United States,
which were somewhat frayed by the Sheinbein affair). For a discussion on United
States-Israeli relations, see generally CHERYL A. RUBENBERG, ISRAEL AND THE
AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 329-76 (1986);
NASEER ARURI, THE OBSTRUCTION OF PEACE: THE U.S., ISRAEL, AND THE
PALESTINIANS 319-56 (1995); MOSEH ARENS, BROKEN COVENANrr: AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CRISIS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL 293-303 (1995)
(critically examining the tensions between the United States and Israel over pro-
posed peace initiatives for the Middle East).
30. See Israel-Basic Law: Judicature (visited June 12, 1999) <http://www.uni-
wuerzburg.de/ law/is03000_.html> (describing the ability of the Supreme Court to
hear appeals from the District Courts); see also Hockstader, supra note 28, at Al
(discussing Sheinbein's right to an appeal that would be heard by the Israeli Su-
preme Court).
31. See Izenberg, supra note 4, at 1 (reporting the Israeli Supreme Court deci-
2000]
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sion, three out of the five sitting judges rejected the lower court's
varying interpretations of citizenship." The Israeli high court also
held that it must follow Israeli law over any international treaties
between Israel and the United States.33
The United States issued a strong, albeit largely ineffective, re-
action to the Israeli Supreme Court decision." United States officials,
however, eventually resigned themselves to aiding the Israeli gov-
ernment in prosecuting Sheinbein.36 Although Israel indicted Shein-
sion to refuse to grant Sheinbein's extradition). The majority stated '"every Israeli
citizen has immunity from extradition, irrespective of his affinity to Israel."' See
Moshe Reinfeld, Sheinbein Wins Appeal as Courts Splits 3-2, HA'ARETZ (Feb.
26, 1999) <http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/htmls/6_4.htm>, cited in Ayelet
Schachar, Whose Republic?: Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli Politv, 13
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 266 n.205 (1999).
32. See Izenberg, supra note 4 (stating that the Court had no right to interpret
Israel's citizenship law because the original intent of the legislators was clear as to
the law's purpose).
33. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 321 (explaining the judges'
refusal to recognize two categories of citizenship and allow any international obli-
gations to override domestic law); see also Israeli Justices Refuse to Extradite U.S.
Teen in Matyland Murder, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26, 1999, at 19, available in 1999 WL
2847540 (discussing the position of the judges on Sheinbein's extradition). In a
minority opinion, Judge Barak opined that the justifications for not extraditing an
individual were not applicable in this case, and that extradition was a paramount
factor in achieving international cooperation on criminal matters. See lzenberg, su-
pra note 4, at 19. Barak also asserted that immunity from extradition can only be
given to an individual "'for whom Israel is the center of his life and who partici-
pates in its life and joins his destiny to that of the country."' See Reinfeld, supra
note 31.
34. See Hillel Kuttler et al., US Officials Upset at Sheinbein Ruling,
JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 26, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 8999994 (discussing
the extreme disappointment of officials such as Attorney General Janet Reno and
State's Attorney Douglas Gansler). Reno stated: "[w]e much prefer that the case be
tried where the crime was committed. Again, a community should be able to speak
out against such injustice and such conduct." Id. Even former Israeli Prime Minis-
ter Binyamin Netanyahu felt apologetic for the decision, but asserted that the Is-
raeli Supreme Court is an apolitical body whose decisions are autonomous under
the principle of separation of powers. See id.
35. See Linzer, supra note 7 (discussing State's Attorney Gansler's feelings of
hopelessness about the case). Israel's Attorney General petitioned the Israeli Su-
preme Court to reconsider its decision, but the Court refused to do so. See
Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 321.
36. See Sheinbein Charged in Tel Aviv with First-Degree Murder, JERUSALEM
POST, Mar. 23, 1999, at 5, available in 1999 WL 9000950 (relating that dozens of
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bein,37 United States and Maryland officials became discouraged by
several delays in Sheinbein's arraignment hearing, ' as well as an un-
expected not-guilty plea entered by the accused. " Even though
Sheinbein eventually changed his not-guilty plea," several sentenc-
ing issues still troubled United States officials."'
II. ANALYSIS OF ISRAEL'S REFUSAL TO GRANT
EXTRADITION
A. CITIZENSHIP, THE LAW OF RETURN, AND THEIR APPLICATION
TO THE SHEINBEIN CASE
Several factors influenced the outcome of the Israeli Supreme
Court's ruling in the Sheinbein case. '2 The decision, however, ulti-
witnesses, including United States police investigators, would have to be flown to
Israel for a possible trial).
37. See Israel Idicts US Teen in 97' Marland Murder, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 23,
1999, at 10, available in 1999 WL 2856054 (reporting that Israel would try Shein-
bein because he successfully fought extradition to the United States).
38. See Katherine Shaver & Ramit Plushnick-Masti, Sheinbein Hearing in Is-
rael Delayed for a Month; Defense in Slaying Case ..lsks for More Records, WASI .
POST, May 17, 1999, at B1, available in 1999 WL 17003402 (discussing the
Maryland State's Attorney's frustration with the Israeli court's decision to further
delay the hearing, referring to the delays as "stalling tactics"); see also Katherine
Shaver, Sheinbein is Given 2nd Delay, WASH. POST, June 14, 1999, at B I, avail-
able in 1999 WL 17008718 (referring to Gansler's implication that the Israeli judi-
cial system is not taking the Sheinbein case seriously).
39. See Heidi J. Gleit, Sheinbein Pleas Innocent to Murder. Con/esses to Mut-
tilating Tello's Body, JERUSALEM POST, July 6, 1999, at 4, available in 1999 WL
9005306 (explaining that although Sheinbein did not plead to murder as Maryland
prosecutors had hoped, he admitted to certain facts surrounding the murder).
Sheinbein apparently misled prosecutors by indicating that he would plead guilty
in exchange for the prosecutor's assurance that they would prevent his extradition.
See id.
40. See Gerald Mizejewski, Tensions over Sheinbein Case I1'on 't Quickly Dis-
sipate, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1999, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (relating that Sheinbein would be eligible for parole at age 33).
41. See Today: Montgonery Count,, Maryland, State 's .4ttorney Doug Gansler
Discusses Samuel Sheinbein's Guilt, Plea in Israel Trial, available in LEXIS,
News Library, NBCNews File (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 25, 1999) [herein-
after Guilty Plea] (assessing some of the concerns about Sheinbein's sentence in
Israel).
42. See inf-a notes 116-88 and accompanying text (presenting several factors
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mately turned on the interpretation of Israeli citizenship and nation-
ality laws in the context of extradition.4 '3 This section analyzes the
reasoning behind the Israeli Supreme Court's decision, and places
the decision in an international context by comparing the ruling with
other extradition decisions and international standards.
Unlike the lower court, the Israeli Supreme Court refused to rec-
ognize more than one category of citizenship in the absence of leg-
islative authority. 4 The law of citizenship upon which the court
based its reasoning has its origins in the Israeli Constitution.4 ' The
constitution guarantees the right of nationality to every Jewish per-46 for
son, provides for citizenship to individuals born to a national, 47 and
establishes that a person cannot lose his nationality other than
through legislative means.4'8 A person may acquire nationality in sev-
eral ways, one of which is through the Law of Return. 9
that Israel may have considered in refusing to extradite one of its citizens, includ-
ing the influence of Jewish history and culture, the impact of human rights consid-
erations, and foreign policy considerations).
43. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning
behind Israel's refusal to grant the United States' extradition request).
44. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 321 (delineating the under-
lying reasoning behind the Court's decision).
45. See CONST. ISR., sec. B(a) (setting forth the Israeli concept of citizenship).
The Constitution provides that, "[e]very Jew has the right to immigrate to Israel
and to acquire Israel nationality ... [which] shall not be limited except under law
for the protection of the public and its health." Id.
46. See id. (providing nationality guarantees to all Jewish people).
47. See id. sec. B(b) (securing Israeli nationality for persons born to Israeli na-
tionals who are residents). The applicable provision reads, "the law shall secure the
acquisition of [I]sraeli nationality by a person born to anyone who is an [I]sraeli
national and a resident of [I]srael." Id.
48. See id. sec. B(c)(1) (stating that "A person shall not be deprived of his Is-
raeli nationality except under law.").
49. See The Law of Return, 1950, 4 L.S.I. 114, (1950) (explaining that an
"oleh" is a Jewish person immigrating into Israel); The Nationality Law arts. 1-2,
1952, 6 L.S.I. 50 (1952) (stating that an oleh may acquire Israeli nationality
through various means: through birth in Israel before or after its establishment, by
coming to Israel after its establishment, or by a person receiving an oleh certificate
under the Section 3 of the Law of Return); see generally ARIEL BIN-NUN, THE
LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 40-41 (1992) (explaining the liberal nature of citi-
zenship as pertaining to the Law of Return); Acquisition of Israeli Nationality (vis-
ited June 12, 1999) <http://israel.org/mfa/go.asp?MFAHOOmzO> (delineating the
four ways through which an individual can become an Israeli national: birth, the
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The Law of Return endows every Jewish individual with the right
to come to Israel as an immigrant and subsequently gain Israeli na-
tionality. 0 This law also sets forth three specific exceptions to a
Jewish individual's right to immigrate.' The definition of a Jewish
individual within this law, however, is open to interpretation. " The
failure of the original version of the Law of Return to address the
question of "who is a Jew?" created doubts as to the term's scope."
As a result, the Israeli Supreme Court- and a 1970 Amendment to
Law of Return, residence, and naturalization); Ayelet Schachar, Whose Republic?:
Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli Polio', 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 240-
48 (1999) (providing historical developments in the Law of Return in the larger
context of defining Israeli citizenship).
50. See The Law of Return, 1950, 4 L.S.I. 114, (1950) (explaining that all
Jewish persons possess the right to immigrate to Israel as an oleh). The Law of
Return further states: "[a]n oleh's visa shall be granted to every Jew who has ex-
pressed his desire to settle in Israel." Id. Israel enacted the Law of Return in reac-
tion to years of anti-Semitic persecution and ill-treatment. See Nancy Caren Rich-
mond, Comment, Israel's Law of Return: Analysis of Its Evolution and Present
Application, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 95, 96 (1993); World Jewish Congress-Poliol
Dispatch # 6 (visited July 7, 1999) <http://\\w.virtual.co.i/orgs/\vjc/
dis6issu.htm> (noting that the Law of Return resulted from the horrors of the
Holocaust, as well as the idea that Jewish people were entitled to return to the
safety of their homeland). Israel is the only country in the world that grants auto-
matic nationality in such a manner. See Richmond, supra, at 99.
51. See The Law of Return, 1950, 4 L.S.I. 114, (1950) (detailing that the grant
of a visa pursuant to the Law of Return is conditioned upon the Minister of the In-
terior's satisfaction that the applicant meets certain characteristics). These qualifi-
cations include that the applicant did not "engage in an activity directed against the
Jewish people; [n]or is likely to endanger public health; [n]or is a person with a
criminal past, likely to endanger public welfare". Id.
52. See Richmond, supra note 50, at 101 (stating that the Knesset originally
failed to define what it meant by the word "Jew").
53. See ARIEL BIN-NUN, THE LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL: AN
INTRODUCTION 15-17 (1992) (explaining that the Law of Return fails to provide a
clear definition because secular and religious authorities cannot forge an agreement
over the scope of who is a "Jew"). See also Schachar, supra note 49, at 246-47
(framing the debate between Orthodox and non-Orthodox groups over what it
means to be a "Jew" and some of the judicial and legislative events that came
about as a result).
54. See Shalit v. Minister of the Interior, 23 P.D. 477 (1969) (allowing children
who did not practice the Jewish religion to be registered as Jews because they
maintained an allegiance to the Jewish people). But see RuTheisen v. Minister of
the Interior, 16 P.D. 2428 (1962) (ruling that one could not forsake Judaism and
maintain their Jewish nationality at the same time).
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the Law of Return attempted to further define Jewish individuals in
terms of nationality."
In contrast to these attempts, the amended Population Registry
Law56 liberalized citizenry standards and broadened the overall
meaning of the word "Jew" by extending rights and privileges to
non-Jewish immigrants. 7 This law allows a non-Jewish national
without a Jewish relative alive or living in Israel to become an Israeli
citizen.:
The Israeli citizenship and nationality laws enabled Samuel Shein-
bein to remain in Israel. 9 Sheinbein's father, Sol, was born in 1944
British-ruled Palestine and left in 1950, two years after the formation
of the State of Israel.6° The elder Sheinbein also held a valid Israeli
passport.6' The lower Israeli court, although ruling in favor of extra-
dition, acknowledged that Sol Sheinbein's citizenship status enabled
his son to seek Israeli citizenship. As a matter of policy, however,
55. See The Law of Return Amend. No. 2, sec. 1, 1969-70, 24 L.S.I. 28, (1969-
1970) (defining a "Jew" as a "person who was born of a Jewish mother or has be-
come converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion"). This
amendment bars an individual who does not satisfy either one of these standards
from gaining Israeli nationality. See Richmond, supra note 50, at 110.
56. See Law of Population Registry Amend. No. 1, 1970, 19 L.S.I. 288, (1970),
cited in Richmond, supra note 50, at 109 (allowing non-Jewish spouses and chil-
dren to obtain the same rights as Jewish immigrants under the Law of Return).
Pursuant to this legislation, these rights no longer depend on whether a Jewish
relative lives or settles in Israel. See id.
57. See id. sec. 4(a) (allowing a non-Jew to enter Israel and obtain Israeli citi-
zenship, even if that individual is not accompanied by another Jewish individual);
see also Richmond, supra note 50, at 109 (discussing the way the change in Israeli
law extended immigration rights to non-Jewish spouses, children, and others).
58. See Richmond, supra note 50, at 109 (discussing the potential implications
for the change in the Population Registry law).
59. See supra notes 22-23, 31-33 and accompanying text (explaining how
Sheinbein's citizenship enabled him to survive a United States' extradition re-
quest).
60. See Hockstader, supra note 28, at Al (discussing Sol Sheinbein's citizen-
ship status in Israel).
61. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 318 (noting that Sol Shein-
bein obtained an Israeli passport in 1976).
62. See Hockstader, supra note 28, at A l (asserting that the lower court recog-
nized the validity of Sheinbein's citizenship claim, even though it ultimately re-
jected the notion that he was enough of a citizen to deserve protection under Israeli
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the court held that the Maryland youth did not possess sufficient ties
with the State of Israel to attain the status of citizenship. The Israeli
Supreme Court subsequently reversed the lower court by deferring to
the intent of the legislature in defining Israeli citizenship.'
Although both the lower and the supreme courts acknowledged
Sheinbein's citizenship status,6' his claim remained problematic.
First, although Sol Sheinbein6 was an Israeli citizen when he left Is-
rael in 1950, Israel did not pass its citizenship law until 1952, two
years after he left.67 Accordingly, the law was not in effect when he
law); see also LoLordo et al., supra note 28, at I B (asserting a notion of citizen-
ship that is acquired through blood). Judge Ravid ruled that citizenship "'is won
through blood which is automatic and does not require knowledge or acceptance. It
is granted whether the person who receives it wants it or not." Id. According to Is-
raeli law, "the offspring of an Israeli parent automatically acquires Israeli citizen-
ship at birth, regardless of the place of birth or the family's effective ties to Israel."
See Schachar, supra note 49, at 266. Although Sheinbein was arguably an Ameri-
can citizen at the time he fled to Israel, this would not preclude him from gaining
Israeli citizenship; under Israeli law, immigrants can establish citizenship upon
return to Israel. See id. Israeli citizenship status is actually considered to take pri-
ority over all other possible citizenship claims. See id. This remains the case even
if an individual lives outside of Israel for an extended period of time and, in that
time, becomes a citizen elsewhere. See id. For a discussion on historical, as well as
recent trends in dual nationality, see generally Peter J. Shapiro, Dual Nationalin'
and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411 (1997) (suggesting that dual
nationality may not pose the problems that it once previously did, and, instead
could become part of larger movement to embrace "the multiple ties of civil soci-
ety.").
63. See Hockstader, supra note 28, at Al (averring that, because Sheinbein
possessed an American passport and visited Israel only a few times, he failed to
create real ties with Israel). The court reasoned: "'citizenship that is empty of
meaning and all feelings and interest is not enough' to afford protection of extradi-
tion." Id.
64. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (explaining the reasons for
the Israeli High Court's refusal to grant the United States' extradition request).
65. See supra notes 30-33, 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing both the
lower and High Court rulings on Sheinbein's extradition).
66. See Ramit Plushnick-Masti, A Fanil's Shame: Sheinbein s Parents De-
scribe Their Pain, Bafflement, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1999, at BI (commenting that
Sol Sheinbein faces being disbarred if he returns to the United States for helping
his son flee to Israel). Sol Sheinbein explained, "[W]ith all due respect to the law, I
am first of all a father and only after that a citizen." Id.
67. See Hockstader, supra note 28, at A l (discussing Sol Sheinbein's departure
from Israel).
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was a resident of Israel." Second, evidence indicated that Samuel
Sheinbein's grandparents renounced their Israeli citizenship when
they came to the United States, consequently barring them and the
rest of their family from making any future claims to Israeli nation-
ality.69 Sheinbein's grandmother undermined these claims, however,
when she testified that she renounced her Israeli citizenship because
of threats from her husband.7" Such circumstances of duress could
nullify her renunciation of Israeli citizenship.7
B. ISRAEL'S REFUSAL TO EXTRADITE ITS NATIONALS
1. The Israeli Supreme Court's Interpretation of Extradition
Once Israel determined that Sheinbein was an Israeli citizen, the
Israeli Supreme Court followed its well-established practice of re-
fusing to extradite its nationals.72 Israel's decision rested on a 1978
change in its extradition law providing that the country could not ex-
tradite its nationals unless the crime or offense took place before the
individual became a national.7 ' Although a 1962 United States-Israel
68. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 318 (questioning the Is-
raeli's Supreme Court's application of the Law of Return as it did not come into
effect until after the elder Sheinbein left Israel).
69. See id. (providing possible flaws in Sheinbein's citizenship based on evi-
dence that his grandparents renounced their Israeli citizenship).
70. See Ramit Plushnick-Masti, Grandmother Testifies at Sheinbein Hearing,
WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1998, at B5, available in 1998 WL 2473761 (stating that
Sheinbein's grandmother signed exit documents renouncing Israeli citizenship be-
cause her husband physically threatened her if she refused). Based on this testi-
mony, Samuel Sheinbein might be able to claim Israeli citizenship. See Abramov-
sky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 318.
71. See Plushnick-Masti, supra note 70, at B5 (stating that the facts relating to
the history of Sheinbein's family are crucial to the Israeli court's decision).
72. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (discussing the Israeli High
Court's decision to deny the United States' request for extradition based on Shein-
bein's citizenship status).
73. See Offenses Committed Abroad (Amendment of Enactments) Law, sec. 2,
32 L.S.I. 63, 64 (1978) (Amending Extradition Law of Aug. 23, 1954) (establish-
ing that an Israeli national shall not be extradited "save for an offense committed
before he became an Israeli national"); see also INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
ISRAEL 392 (Amos Shapira & Karen C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995) (noting that the
amendment to Israel's extradition law protected nationals from extradition so long
as they committed the crime in question before becoming an Israeli citizen).
682 [15:667
THE SHEINBEIN LEGACY
extradition treaty explicitly forbade either party from declining to
extradite nationals,7 4 the Israeli Supreme Court interpreted the more
recent change in Israeli extradition law to take precedence and pre-
empt the treaty.75
2. The International Standard in Refusing to Extradite Nationals
Although Israel's denial of extradition conflicted with the United
States' interests, other nations similarly deny an extradition request
when the accused is a national." For example, many European and
74. See Extradition Convention, supra note 3, art. IV (establishing that neither
party to the treaty may decline an extradition request solely because the accused is
a national). The Extradition Convention states, in part, that "[e]ach Contracting
Party agrees... reciprocally to deliver up persons found in its territory who have
been charged with or convicted of any of the offenses mentioned in Article II of
the present Convention committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
other ... ." Id. art. I.
75. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 321 (explaining how Justice
Orr considered Israel's extradition law to hold primacy over its international obli-
gations, thereby forcing the Supreme Court to follow it). Because Israeli courts ap-
ply the rule of lex posterior derogat priori, the 1978 amendment takes precedence
over Israel's previous extradition law and ultimately forces Israel to act contrary to
its original treaty obligations. See Petkunas, supra note 22, at 219-20. See also
BLACK'S LAWv DICTIONARY 822 (5th ed. 1979) (defining lex posterior derogat pri-
ori, or the last-in-time-rule, as a doctrine which holds that a later statute debilitates
a prior one by either repeal, or language that is repugnant to the prior statute).
76. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing the United States
frustration with Israel's denial of extradition).
77. See Joshua S. Spector, Extraditing Mexican Nationals in the Fight Against
International Narcotics Crimes, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1007, 1018 (1998) (noting
that many governments, particularly European and other civil law nations, refuse
to extradite their nationals). Among the reasons for declining extradition are: (1) a
State's general duty is to protect its own citizens; (2) the State is capable of prose-
cuting their nationals at home; (3) concern with excessive or cruel punishment in
other countries; and (4) the disadvantages of conducting a trial in a foreign land.
See id. at 1018-19. States declining extradition may also articulate the position
that: (1) most States have legislation punishing citizens who commit offenses
abroad, thereby lessening the need for extradition; and (2) a superior right of trial
exists in the country where the fugitive is a citizen. See Christopher C. Joyner &
Wayne P. Rothbaum, Libya and the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie: What Lessons for
International Extradition Law?, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 222, 242 (1993). But see id.
(asserting that the non-extradition of nationals results from cultural xenophobia
and the tendency of nations to view different judicial systems with suspicion).
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Latin American nations refuse to extradite their nationals. 8 Some
nations have maintained this policy since the early nineteenth cen-
tury. More importantly, international law on extradition does not
explicitly prohibit nations from refusing to extradite their citizens. "'
The United Nations (UN), for example, determined that the refusal to
extradite nationals is an acceptable limitation on extradition.' The
UN, however, provides that when a nation refuses to extradite one of
its nationals, that nation must take domestic action against the re-
quested fugitive.82 In addition to a UN resolution, the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law also recognizes that it is acceptable to refuse
extradition requests for nationals." The Restatement also provides
several ways to define the nationality of an individual in relation to
the crime or offense committed.84
78. See Spector, supra note 77, at 1018 n.90 (noting that Germany, Switzer-
land, and France do not extradite their nationals); see also Nadelmann, supra note
1, at 851 (stating that most Latin American governments refuse to extradite their
citizens). The United States typically allows for the extradition of United States
nationals, even to nations explicitly prohibiting the extradition of their own nation-
als to the United States. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 594.
79. See Nadelmann, supra note 1, at 851-52 (providing a historical backdrop
for certain nations who do not extradite their nationals).
80. See infra notes 81-84 (providing several international legal standards that
allow States to refuse to extradite their nationals).
81. See G.A. Res. 116, UN GAOR, 45th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 100, at art.
4(a), UN Doc. A/RES/45/116 (1991) (establishing that nations may, at their option,
refuse to grant extradition if the requested individual is a national of that State).
82. See id. (providing that a State must, at the request of the other nation, sub-
mit the case to the necessary authorities and take the appropriate action).
83. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES sec. 475, cmt. f (1987) (noting that some treaties provide that States will
not grant extradition of their nationals). Whereas some treaties prohibit the extra-
dition of nationals, others leave it to the discretion of the States involved. See id.
cmt. g. In general, a State may use its discretion in refusing to grant extradition.
See id.
84. See id. (providing several timeframes through which States may determine
the nationality of the person sought).
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C. OTHER EXTRADITION ExAMPLES: ISRAELIS WHO RETURNED
AND AMERICANS WHO DID NOT
1. Israeli Extraditions Granted: The Nakash and Manning Cases
The Sheinbein case is not the first example of an individual seek-
ing to gain Israeli citizenship in order to prevent extradition for a
pending criminal prosecution." In the other situations, however, Is-
rael granted extradition. 6 Although the facts of these cases are dis-
tinguishable from those of the Sheinbein case, they provide several
legal standards that the Israeli Supreme Court could have considered
in weighing the United States' extradition request."
The case of William Nakash, an individual who fled to Israel and
gained Israeli citizenship after allegedly committing a murder in
France, provides one of the more famous extradition cases in Israeli
history." The Israeli Supreme Court granted France's extradition re-
quest, asserting that refusing to extradite was only an option where
special circumstances existed, such as political or humanitarian con-
siderations." The court further opined that it could refuse to extradite
for non-political reasons only where the foreign nation made an un-
justified extradition request or threatened to mistreat the accused.'
85. See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text (providing two other in-
stances where fugitives have sought the safety of Israeli citizenship laws).
86. See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text (discussing two renowned ex-
amples of Israel's willingness to grant extradition in the cases of William Nakash
and Robert Manning).
87. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (providing the reasoning be-
hind Israel's willingness to grant extradition in other instances).
88. See Keinon, supra note 15, at 11 (discussing the relevance of the Nakash
case in assessing Israel's refusal to grant extradition). In the midst of public debate
over Nakash's extradition, the Israeli Justice Minister declared that he would
"rather be known as soft-hearted than bear responsibility for sending Nakash to his
death in a French prison." Id.
89. See Naomi Hillel, A Digest of Selected Judgments of 1he Supreme Court of
Israel, 23 ISR. L. REv. 506, 508 (1989) (discussing the reasoning behind the ma-
jority opinion of the Israeli Supreme Court).
90. See id. (providing further reasoning behind the Israeli Court's willingness
to extradite Nakash). In that case, the Israeli Court rejected the argument of the de-
fendant that his circumstances fell within the purview of a "humanitarian consid-
eration," thereby authorizing the Court to decline to extradite him. See id.
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In the 1980s, Israel's extradition law became the focus of attention
once again when the Mannings, an American couple accused of
killing a Southern California woman, fled to Israel and gained Israeli
citizenship. 9' Despite arguments that the couple had strong ties to the
country, Israel ultimately chose to honor its international commit-
ments and extradite the Mannings to the United States,9' where Rob-
ert Manning received a life sentence.93
In adjudicating the Sheinbein case, the Israeli Supreme Court
could have applied the standard set forth in the Nakash case, which
mandates that Israel can only deny extradition if the extradition is
unjustified or there is a threat of mistreatment. 4 Additionally, based
on the gravity of the crime and the dubious nature of Sheinbein's
citizenship claims, 95 the Israeli Supreme Court could have found
91. See Court Orders Mannings Extradited To Face Murder Charges in the
U.S., JERUSALEM POST, June 9, 1991, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File (hereinafter Court Orders Mannings] (reporting that the murdered
woman opened a package rigged with explosives). Although the Mannings deliv-
ered the package, they claimed that they intended for the woman's boss to receive
and open it. See id.
92. See Carl Schrag, Legal Considerations, and Others, JERUSALEM POST, June
14, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (presenting the various
legal arguments for and against the extradition of the Mannings). On behalf of the
Mannings, some argued, "[w]e are not talking about a person who fled the law...
[w]e aren't looking at charges connected to a crime committed last month." 1d. In
dismissing these arguments, one Hebrew scholar stated: "[w]e enacted the extradi-
tion law and treaty with the U.S .... [n]obody forced it on us. The law's purpose is
to serve the state that created it. Do we think the U.S. will extradite people to Israel
if we refuse to extradite people to the U.S.?" Id. Reinforcing this idea, another pro-
fessor of Jewish law expressed concerns about the implications for Jewish people
if they did not abide by their current extradition agreements. See id.
93. See Tom Tugend, Robert Manning Gets Life Sentence for Part in 1980 LA
Mail-bomb, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 9, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Arcnws File (informing that the United States District Court imposed a life
sentence on Manning, pursuant to which he will be eligible for parole in thirty
years). The judge also refused to allow Manning to serve his sentence in an Israeli
prison. See id.
94. See Hillel, supra note 89, at 508 (setting forth the standards articulated by
the Israeli Supreme Court in choosing to grant the extradition of Nakash). A court
may use its discretion in determining whether to extradite when there are political
or humanitarian considerations. See id.
95. See supra notes 63, 66-71 and accompanying text (discussing some of the




Sheinbein's extradition justifiable, just as it did in the Manning
case.96 Despite the assertions that Sheinbein could face mistreatment,
or even death, in an American prison," some commentators argue
that there is no danger of such mistreatment."
While the Nakash and Manning cases are factually similar to the
Sheinbein case, his situation could be distinguishable on one impor-
tant ground.99 Both the Nakash and Manning cases involved fugitives
who were not Israeli citizens when they committed their offenses.":
Sheinbein, on the other hand, arguably possessed citizenship status
from birth through his father.'0 ' Thus, he was already a citizen when
he committed his crime.0 "2 Based on Israel's extradition law, this en-
abled Israel to decline the United States' extradition request.'
96. See Schrag, supra note 92 (presenting several scholarly assertions that, due
to the 20-year statute of limitation on murder, and the fact that the crime took place
before the Mannings received Israeli citizenship, Israel should honor its commit-
ment with the United States and extradite the couple).
97. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (presenting the viewpoint
that Sheinbein faces potential danger or death if forced to serve his sentence in the
United States).
98. See Izenberg, supra note 4, at 1 (reporting Justice Barak's dissenting opin-
ion, in which he states that there are no concerns with respect to United States
courts trying Sheinbein, as it is not an unfamiliar system with an untrustworthy ju-
diciary); AJ Congress Says Change in Israeli Extradition Law, to Prevent Future
Sheinbein Situations, is 'Welcome First Step,. But Accused Should Serve Sentence
Where Crime was Committed, Not in Israel, as Legislation Mandates, PR
NEWswiRE, Apr. 20, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group File
[hereinafter First Step] (statement of the American Jewish Congress) (stating that
Israeli extradition laws were intended to protect its citizens from other countries
whose courts would prejudice Israelis, not United States courts).
99. See Keinon, supra note 15, at 11 (noting that Sheinbein's case may differ
from Nakash's and Manning's cases because Sheinbein committed his crime as an
Israeli).
100. See id. (comparing the citizenship status of fugitives in other Israeli extra-
dition examples); see also Schrag, supra note 92 (noting that, despite Israel's pol-
icy of refusing to extradite its nationals, the Mannings could still be extradited be-
cause they did not hold Israeli citizenship at the time they committed their crime).
101. See Keinon, supra note 15, at 11 (explaining how Sol Sheinbein's citizen-
ship status enabled his son to make a claim for Israeli citizenship).
102. See id. (asserting that some individuals, including the justice minister rep-
resenting Sheinbein, felt that Sheinbein possessed Israeli citizenship when he
committed the offense).
103. See Offenses Committed Abroad (Amendment of Enactments) Law. sec. 2.
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2. Other Nations' Failure to Cooperate with U.S. Extradition
Requests: Einhorn and Del Toro's Safeharbor
Recent examples of Americans fleeing the United States in order
to evade justice have garnered international attention.'0 These fugi-
tives, like Sheinbein, attempted to use the laws of foreign nations as
a shield from United States prosecution. '05 One recent example is the
case of Ira Einhorn, an American who fled to Europe after allegedly
murdering his girlfriend.10 6 French police arrested and detained him
while they awaited a United States extradition request. 0 7 France,
however, would ultimately not extradite Einhorn because it believed
1978, 32 L.S.I. 63, 64 (1978) (establishing that the State cannot extradite an Israeli
national unless the crime took place before the individual attained citizenship
status).
104. See generally Andrew Blankstein, Street Beat; When Police Work May, Not
Be Enough, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1997, at B3 (explaining Mexico's refusal to ex-
tradite a United States citizen who killed four people); Anita Snow, Cuba Gives
Financier 13-Year Sentence; American Fugitive Robert Vesco Convicted of Eco-
nomic Crimes Against the State, AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, Aug. 27, 1996
(recounting the notoriety of Robert Vesco, who was convicted in a Cuban court
after evading American authorities); Michael Georgy, Fugitive In Jordan De-
scribes Slaying of Wife in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1994, at AI (detailing
the extradition struggle between Jordan and the United States for a man who mur-
dered his wife in New Jersey, and then fled to Amman, Jordan); see also John Pak,
Canadian Extradition and the Death Penalty: Seeking a Constitutional Assurance
of Life, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 239, 249-51 (1993) (explaining Canada's reluctant
extradition of both John Kindler and Charles Chitat Ng to the United States, due to
fears that the murderous fugitives would receive capital punishment).
105. See S. Res. 171, 106th Cong. (1999) (considering Mexico's refusal to ex-
tradite United States citizen Jose Luis Del Toro to the United States until the State
of Florida agreed not to impose capital punishment on him).
106. See French Reject Extradition of Ex-U.S. Guru, DALLAS MORN. NEWS,
Dec. 5, 1997, at 12A, available in 1997 WL 16182724 [hereinafter French Reject
Extradition] (recounting Einhorn's disappearance to Europe before his trial for the
murder of his girlfriend, whose body was found in a trunk in Einhorn's closet in
1977). While Einhorn was missing, a Philadelphia jury tried him in absentia and
convicted him for murder. See id. Although the Montgomery County State's At-
torney's Office considered trying Sheinbein in absentia, they felt doing so would
be unconstitutional because Sheinbein was never under the jurisdiction of their
court system. See Mizejewski, supra note 40, at Al.
107. See French Reject Extradition, supra note 106, at 12A (discussing how
French officials finally caught and arrested Einhorn-who operated under the as-
sumed name of Eugene Mallon-in Bordelais, France in June 1997).
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that the United States legal system was lacking in fairness. '
The Mexican government's recent refusal to extradite Del Toro, an
American fugitive accused of committing a murder in Florida, also
provides an illustrative example of a case in which a foreign nation
refused to extradite an American citizen. '0 Del Toro, like Sheinbein,
committed a particularly heinous crime,"' yet he successfully sought
refuge under Mexican extradition law."' Similar to Israel, Mexico
chose to harbor the fugitive despite his status as a United States citi-
zen and the existence of an extradition treaty with the United
States."'
Although these cases do not have any direct precedential bearing
on the Sheinbein case, they suggest that Israel is not alone in its un-
willingness to cooperate with United States law enforcement officials
seeking to prosecute fugitives."' First, like Israel, these other coun-
tries declined extradition due to concerns that the United States
would treat the accused unjustly."4 Furthermore, these countries re-
108. See Abramovsky, supra note 2, at 325 (explaining France's primary con-
cem that United States law would not guarantee the right to a new trial after a trial
in absentia).
109. See S. Res. 171, 106th Cong. (1999) (relating the sentiment that the United
States should renegotiate its extradition treaty with Mexico to allow for the possi-
bility of capital punishment).
110. See id. (describing how the victim's two-year old quadruplets likely wit-
nessed the brutal murder, and how her thirteen-year old daughter discovered her in
a bloodbath).
111. See id. (reviewing the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty, which pro-
vides that the Mexican government may refuse to extradite persons for crimes
punishable by the death penalty); see also infra notes 142-49 and accompanying
text (providing the basis for denying extradition on death penalty grounds).
112. See Convention on Extradition, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059,
5061. This Convention states that, "[t]he Contracting Parties agree to mutually ex-
tradite... persons who the component authorities of the requesting Party have
charged with an offense or have found guilty of committing an offense." h. In ad-
dition to Israel and Mexico, other nations are also parties to extradition agreements
with the United States. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art.
IV, 28 U.S.T. 227; Extradition Treaty, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., art. 6, 27 U.S.T.
983.
113. See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text (discussing other extradi-
tion cases in which nations refused extradition).
114. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (addressing France's reasons for
failing to grant extradition).
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fused to grant extradition even for especially brutal crimes, where an
extradition treaty with the United States was in place."'
III. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EXTRADITION
OF ISRAELI CITIZENS AND THEIR APPLICATION
TO THE SHEINBEIN CASE
Although the Israeli Supreme Court decision centered on the
question of citizenship, three other factors could have influenced the
high court's ruling. "6 First, the effect of Jewish culture and traditions
figured prominently. ' 7 Second, the court could have feared that a
foreign judicial system would subject an Israeli to cruel or severe
punishment."8 Finally, foreign relations impacted both the United
States and Israel's role in the extradition case.19
A. THE INFLUENCE OF JEWISH RELIGION, CULTURE, AND HISTORY
Israel's refusal to grant extradition may be rooted, in part, in its
religion, culture, and history.'20 The first aspect of Jewish culture that
115. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (discussing the gruesome
nature of Del Toro's crime and the existence of an extradition treaty between
Mexico and the United States).
116. See infra notes 120-88 and accompanying text (presenting several factors
that likely shaped Israel's refusal to extradite Samuel Sheinbein to the United
States).
117. See infra notes 120-41 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of
Jewish religion, culture, and history on the extradition ruling).
118. See infra notes 142-64 and accompanying text (explaining how humanitar-
ian considerations can impact extradition rulings).
119. See infra notes 165-91 and accompanying text (asserting that foreign policy
played an important role in the Sheinbein case).
120. See Michael J. Broyde, Symposium: The Relevance of Religion on a Law-
yer's Work: An Interfaith Conference: The Theological Perspective: Practicing
Criminal Law: A Jewish Law Analysis of Being a Prosecutor or Defense Attorney,
66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1141, 1142-44 (1998) (describing Israeli decisions to prose-
cute or defend criminals in a religious context); see also Jennifer Andes, Jewish
Leaders Denounce U.S. threat to Israel (visited May 24, 1999)
<http://www.jrnl.com/news/97/Oct/jrn199031097.html> (providing the history be-
hind Jewish refusals to grant extradition). One American supporter of Israel's ex-
tradition law argued that "Israel created its laws to protect Jews from worldwide
persecution that existed throughout history, from the time the Romans conquered
Ancient Israel through the Middle Ages and beyond... Jews faced injustice
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is reflected in Israeli extradition law is found in the Talmudic text it-
self.12 The Talmud contains passages rebuking those who aid the
government in prosecuting criminals.'" Some religious interpreta-
tions are based on the proviso that only the Lord should judge and
destroy the bad elements of society. Hence, individuals should not
turn criminals over to secular authorities.'3 Moreover, such interpre-
tations conclude that it is wrong to surrender Jewish suspects to
authorities who possess little mercy or respect for the Jewish peo-
ple. 24 Former Prime Minister Menachem Begin,'"- for example, as-
serted religious justifications in arguing for the non-extradition of Is-
raeli nationals. 26 As support for his position, Begin quoted a passage




Historical forces also shaped the desire of the Jewish people to
seek protections from foreign persecution.'2 Historically, concerns of
a non-Jewish judiciary treating Jewish people with an uneven hand
whenever their fate was put in the hands of a non-Jewish judiciary." Id.
121. See Broyde, supra note 120, at 1142-44 (analyzing provisions of the Tal-
mudic text as an expression of consternation against the prosecution of Jews).
122. See id. at 1141-44 (expressing disapproval of those who aid in prosecuting
Israelis). According to one interpretation, the only context in which it is acceptable
to help the government prosecute is if the criminal posed a threat to the life of oth-
ers or the community itself. See id. at 1144.
123. See id. at 1145 n.19 (elaborating on comments by Justice Menachem Elon,
in which he used arguments from religious scholars to frame the debate over the
extradition of Jews) (citing Aloni v. Minister of Justice, H.C. 852J86, 42(2) P.D. 1
(1987)). Justice Elon stated that, originally, some scholars preferred that God judge
wrongdoers, but over time, virtually all scholars agreed that one should hand over
Jewish transgressors if they endangered the public. See id.
124. See id. (asserting that the State should not turn over Jews to anti-Semitic
authorities).
125. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 311 (describing the Prime
Minister's use of religious rhetoric).
126. See id. (delineating the way in which the Prime Minister argued for the
non-extradition of Israeli nationals).
127. See id. (referring to the Prime Minister's quoting of Deuteronomy 23:15
which states "You shall not give up to his master a slave who has escaped from his
master to you.").
128. See Andes, supra note 120 (describing the history of worldwide Jewish
persecution and the creation of Israel as a safe-haven for Jews after the Holocaust).
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of justice haunted Israeli policy on extradition.' 29 With the construc-
tion of the Jewish State in the wake of World War II and the Holo-
caust, these fears intensified. " In this light, one of the purposes be-
hind the creation of Israel and its laws was to protect the Jewish
people from future persecution."' Furthermore, Israel declared itself
a haven for every Jew who sought refuge from anti-Semitic attacks."
These historical forces,' coupled with several high profile extra-
dition cases, led Israel to profoundly distrust the judicial systems of
foreign governments.14 With the aid of former Prime Minister Begin,
129. See id. (explaining how Jews historically faced the threat of a biased judici-
ary). In his concurring opinion in the Sheinbein ruling, Justice Menahem Ilan re-
ferred to a medieval account of anti-Semitism in a Muslim ruled judiciary. See
generally Stuart Schoffman, Israel's Point of No Return, WASH. POST, Mar. 28,
1999, at Bi, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (discussing Israeli
fears of anti-Semitic treatment in non-Israeli jurisdictions).
130. See Kraft, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that Israel passed its anti-extradition
law in response to the Holocaust experience); see also Abramovsky & Edelstein,
supra note 1, at 312 (noting former Prime Minister Begin's status as a survivor of
the Holocaust and stating that this ultimately shaped his unwillingness to turn
Jewish people over to foreign courts); Schoffman, supra note 129, at BI (asserting
that the Jewish State is "predicated on immigration" and seeks to protect any Jew-
ish person that moves there).
131. See BIN-NUN, supra note 49, at 109-10 (providing a history behind the Na-
zis and Their Helpers (Punishment) Law, 1950, which prosecutes crimes commit-
ted against the Jewish people under the Nazi regime). This law applies the death
penalty retroactively to crimes committed worldwide, and cannot be limited by
double jeopardy. See id.; see also Gloria M. Weisman, World Fact Book of Crimi-
nal Justice Systems (visited June 12, 1999)
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/wfbcjisr.txt> (asserting that the death
penalty in Israel is only used in two cases, one of which is a crime against the
Jewish people).
132. See DECLARATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL (1948) (declaring that the State
of Israel will be open for Jewish immigrants and exiles); see also Schoffman, su-
pra note 129, at BI (explaining how the State of Israel is based on the very notion
of immigration and, therefore, the State is willing to welcome even those persons
with the most tenuous connections to the nation); Israeli Nationality, supra note 23
(discussing the Law of Return, which grants a Jewish person the right to come
back to Israel and become an Israeli citizen if they are the child or grandchild of a
Jewish person).
133. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text (providing some historical
justifications for Israel's anti-extradition position).
134. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 311-15 (discussing the effect
of high-profile cases such as the Dreyfus Affair in convincing the Israeli govern-
ment to change its extradition laws). Similarly, Robert Soblen, a United States citi-
692 [ 15:667
THE SHEINBEIN LEGACY
this distrust resulted in Israel's passage of the anti-extradition law of
1978.' Begin and the Israeli Parliament's reasoning, embodied in
the 1978 law, foretold of the Israeli Supreme Court's Sheinbein deci-
sion.
36
The foregoing concerns, however, were not applicable to Samuel
Sheinbein for two reasons. First, Sheinbein sought shelter under Is-
raeli law despite having little or no national ties" to the nation."" In
that regard, some commentators assert that Sheinbein was merely
evading American justice by exploiting more lenient Israeli laws,'
thereby making the country a safe-haven for criminals worldwide."'
zen, was convicted of spying for the Soviet Union and fled to Israel. See id. at 311.
Soblen sought protection from Israel, who, nonetheless, deported him to the United
States. See id. Soblen, however, committed suicide before his criminal proceed-
ings. See id. The Soblen case created outrage among Jewish religious leaders who
felt that no Jewish individual should ever be forced to leave Israel. See Schrag, su-
pra note 92.
135. See Izenberg, supra note 4, at 1 (describing how Begin supported the extra-
dition lav by telling the Knesset to take into account the Jewish situation in other
countries); Kraft, supra note 3 (discussing the influence of Prime Minister Begin in
the Knesset's passing of the 1978 law).
136. See Izenberg, supra note 4, at I (discussing the reasoning of Justice Or,
who felt that the Israeli legislators demonstrated their explicit intent and under-
stood that the law could potentially protect Israelis who had gone to other coun-
tries).
137. See Hockstader, supra note 28, at A I (explaining how Sheinbein's claims
of national ties to Israel are tenuous at best). Sheinbein held an American passport,
did not speak Hebrew, and only made a few trips to Israel. See idL In his lower
court ruling, Judge Ravid stated that, "[a] citizenship that is empty of meaning and
all feelings and interest is not enough" to establish national ties. See id.
138. See Kraft, supra note 3, at 2 (providing a number of extradition examples
where the suspect had limited Jewish identity).
139. See Morning Edition: Sanuel Sheinbein Case: Carol J an Dam Reports on
the Reaction of Jews in the United States to Israel's Role in the Samuel Sheinbein
Case (NPR broadcast, Aug. 12, 1998) (highlighting the Jewish-American reaction
to the Israeli Supreme Court's refusal to grant extradition). Van Dam reports that
"[m]any in the Jewish community are... outraged that Sheinbein will not spend
the rest of his life in jail." Id.
140. See Matthew Kalman, Israel Amends laiv; Lets Nonresidents be Ertradited,
Won't Apply to U.S. Teenager Who Fled to A void Murder Prosecution in Manr-
land, USA TODAY, Apr. 20, 1999, at 1 IA, available in 1999 WL 6840218 (quoting
Hanan Porat, the head of the Knesset Constitution Law Committee, who stated that
the law threatened to make Israel a safe-haven for criminals); see also Robert B.
Robbins, Irresponsible Decision, JERUSALEM POST. Mar. 25, 1999, at 8, available
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Second, even if Sheinbein legitimately seeks legal refuge in Israel, he
should not need protection from the United States judicial system
due to his status as a United States citizen.1
41
B. INTERESTS IN PROTECTING THE FUGITIVE FROM DEATH,
DANGER, OR A LIFE SENTENCE
Many nations,' 42 including Israel, have abolished the death pen-
alty.' 43 Consequently, these nations prohibit the extradition of their
citizens if it could result in the imposition of the death penalty.' 44 The
reasons for withholding extradition in death penalty situations are
humanitarian in nature; a State outlawing capital punishment would
in 1999 WL 9001057 (expressing concerns about Israel becoming a refuge for any
person who rightfully claims citizenship).
141. See Izenberg, supra note 4, at 1 (reporting Justice Barak's dissenting opin-
ion in which he stated that, with the Sheinbein case, there were no concerns about
being tried in an unfamiliar system with an untrustworthy judiciary); First Step,
supra note 98 (stating that the purpose of the extradition law was to protect Israelis
from countries where courts would be prejudiced, not American courts).
142. See John Quigley, Execution of Foreign Nationals in the United States:
Pressure from Foreign Governments Against the Death Penalty, 4 ILSA INT'L &
COMP. L. 589, 589 (1998) (discussing how approximately half of the world's
countries, including all of Western Europe, choose not to impose the death pen-
alty). The nations of Western Europe widely adhere to a European treaty outlawing
capital punishment as a human rights violation. See Protocol No. 6 to the Conven-
tion of the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the
Abolition of the Death Penalty, Apr. 28, 1983, Europe T.S. 114, reprinted in 22
I.L.M. 538 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1985).
143. See Weisman, supra note 131 (noting that Israel may only impose the death
penalty in two instances: crimes against the Jewish people by Nazis and crimes
against humanity). Israel has only imposed the death penalty once in its history.
See id.; see also Court Orders Mannings, supra note 91, at I (discussing the posi-
tion of Israeli activists who oppose the extradition of Israelis to countries that im-
pose the death penalty).
144. See Model Treaty on Extradition, G.A. Res. 45/116, UN GAOR, 45th
Sess., at 6, UN Doc. A/RES/45/116 (1991) (mandating that nations which utilize
the death penalty and request the extradition of a fugitive must assure the requested
nation that the death penalty will not be imposed, or actually effectuated). See also
Nadelmann, supra note 1, at 835 (stating that governments that abolished the death
penalty in their own countries refuse to grant extradition to nations who still have
capital punishment). The United States is a party to numerous extradition treaties
that stipulate that the other country can refuse to grant extradition if there is a pos-
sibility that the suspect could face the death penalty. See Susan M. McGarvey,
Missed Opportunity? The Affirmation of the Death Penalty in the AEDPA: Extra-
dition Scenarios, 24 J. LEGIS. 99, 102 n.30 (1998).
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likewise be unwilling to subject one of its citizens to capital punish-
ment in a foreign land.'45 The UN memorialized this commitment in
its Universal Declaration of Human Rights' 6 and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).' " In these docu-
ments, the UN declares that no individual should endure cruel or un-
usual punishment,' and that every person maintains the right to
life.149 Consistent with these international standards, Israel prohibits
extradition in cases where the suspect could potentially face the
death penalty. 50
In the Sheinbein case, moral considerations regarding the death
penalty were moot. Maryland could not have imposed the death
145. See Craig R Roecks, Extradition, Human Rights, and the Death Penalty:
When Nations Must Refuse to Extradite a Person Charged with a Capital Crime,
25 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 189, 189 (1994) (discussing the refusal of some States to
extradite suspects who may face the death penalty upon their return). These States
frequently equate the death penalty with torture or degrading punishment. See il.
146. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A)(I11), UN
GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]
(setting forth a prohibition on severe penalties). Under the Universal Declaration,
"[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment." 1d.
147. See Ilternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), UN GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1967) [here-
inafter International Covenant]. The International Covenant provides that, "No
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to
medical or scientific experimentation." Id.
148. See id. (establishing the minimum level of treatment individuals must re-
ceive from member nations); see also Nadelmann, supra note I, at 837 (noting for-
eign courts' rulings that the extradition of a suspect violates the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, which also prohibits torture or inhumane treatment). In
Europe, "the freedom from the death penalty is rapidly developing into a new hu-
man right which ought to be exercised in favor of all individuals, even if the sen-
tence is to be imposed outside the Council of Europe." GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS
OF EXTRADITION LAW 100 (1991).
149. See International Covenant, supra note 147, at 51 (declaring that "[e]very
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of life.")
150. See Hillel, supra note 89, at 508 (1989) (citing Aloni v. Minister of Justice,
H.C. 852/86, 41(2) P.D. 42 (1987)) (explaining how an Israeli decision not to ex-
tradite is only limited to certain circumstances, one of which is when the suspect
could be subject to inhumane treatment or death).
151. See infra notes 152-59 and accompanying text (explaining that humanitar-
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penalty on Sheinbein because he did not meet the minimum age re-
quirement. 52 Consequently, the maximum sentence that Sheinbein
could have received under Maryland law would have been life im-
prisonment."' Israel, however, may have been concerned about the
possible imposition of a life sentence. 5 4 The Canadian government
recently asserted this argument to justify their refusal to comply with
a United States extradition request. 55 Like Sheinbein, the fugitive in
the Canadian case did not face capital punishment, but Canada ve-
hemently asserted that the mandatory minimum sentence would be
unjust.5 6 Although Israel did not articulate this position, it could have
argued that a life sentence, in and of itself, is an extreme form of
punishment. 5 7 Whereas most jurisdictions in the United States im-
pose a sentence of life in prison for first-degree murder,'58 Israel typi-
ian considerations are inapplicable as they apply to the death penalty in Shein-
bein's case).
152. See MD ANN. CODE art. 27, sec. 412(g) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (es-
tablishing that a person will not receive a death sentence in Maryland if he or she
was less than eighteen years old at the time the murder was committed).
153. See id. (explaining how Israel cannot refuse to extradite Sheinbein in order
to avoid capital punishment); see also Kuttler et al., supra note 34, at I (stating
that, although Maryland has the death penalty, the suspect's age prevents him from
being subjected to it).
154. See infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text (discussing Israel's concerns
with the possibility of Sheinbein facing a life sentence in an American prison).
155. See Monica McHam, All's Well That Ends Well: A Pragmatic Look at In-
ternational Criminal Extradition, 20 Hous. J. INT'L L. 419, 448 (1998) (detailing
Canada's interpretation of international extradition law, which enabled a fugitive
to remain in Canada).
156. See id. (discussing United States v. Jamieson, in which Canada based its
refusal to extradite a United States citizen on fears of harsh United States sentenc-
ing). See generally United States v. Jamieson, [1992] 73 C.C.C.3d 460 (Can.). Al-
though the fugitive in that case did not face capital punishment, Canada considered
the mandatory minimum sentence to be cruel and unusual punishment. See
McHam, supra note 155.
157. See Model Treaty on Extradition, supra note 144 (setting forth the condi-
tion that a nation does not have to surrender the fugitive if the receiving nation
does not guarantee that a life or indeterminate sentence will not be imposed). But
see Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 345-46 (asserting that Israel would
not regard a life sentence as a violation of human rights).
158. See Kuttler et al., supra note 34, at 1 (indicating that Sheinbein would re-
ceive a life sentence).
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cally administers a shorter sentence.'
Israel may have also been concerned about potential threats of
violence against Sheinbein in an American prison."' The victim's
Hispanic ethnicity complicated these concerns."' The Hispanic
community reacted strongly to Tello's murder, which, in turn, might
portend retaliation against Sheinbein in a United States prison.' The
Sheinbein family also painted a negative picture of Tello, evoking
further outrage in the Hispanic community."' Furthermore, many
members of the Hispanic community felt that Israel would have de-
cided in favor of extradition if the victim had been Jewish or Cauca-
sian.' 
6
159. See Maryland State Prosecutor, supra note 3 (suggesting that Sheinbein
would receive a substantially less severe sentence in the Israeli judicial system); J:
McHam, supra note 155 (discussing Canada's creative interpretation of interna-
tional extradition law as enabling a fugitive to remain within its borders).
160. See Hockstader, supra note 28, at Al (stating that Sheinbein fought extra-
dition because he feared abusive treatment while in a United States jail); see also
Sheinbein Charged in Tel Aviv with First-Degree Murder, JERUSALEM POST, Mar.
23, 1999, at 5, available in 1999 WL 9000950 (stating that Sheinbein feared that
someone would attempt to take revenge for Tello's death and put his life in dan-
ger). Sheinbein thus argued that granting extradition would be the equivalent of
sentencing him to death. See id.
161. See Dean, supra note 5 (noting that Tello, whose grandmother was Costa
Rican, was Hispanic).
162. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note I, at 313-14 (opining that His-
panic gangs in United States prisons might threaten Sheinbein and endanger his
life); see also Yosef Goell, 'Galut' Justice, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 1, 1999, at 8,
available in 1999 WL 9000109 (asserting that a failure to extradite Sheinbein
would result in anti-Semitism within the Hispanic community); Kuttler et al., su-
pra note 34, at 19 (noting the reaction in the Hispanic community over the brutal
murder). Some commentators asserted that former State's Attorney Robert Dean
used this sentiment to his advantage by attempting to garner additional political
support in the Hispanic community. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at
316.
163. See Dean, supra note 5 (discussing how Sheinbein's family and their law-
yers delved into Tello's past in order to cast him in a negative light and possibly
create a defense for the two suspects). Hispanic leaders felt that this strategy was
an attempt to exploit traditional Latino stereotypes. See id.
164. See Adrienne T. Washington, Sheinbein "s Sentence flardly Fits the Crime,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1999, at C2, available in 1999 WL 3092971 (reporting on
the Hispanic community's suspicion that Israel's decision would have been differ-
ent if the victim had been of a different ethnicity); see also All Things Considered
(NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 2, 1999), available in LEXIS, News Library, News
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C. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN POLICY IN INFLUENCING THE ISRAELI
DECISION
The complexion of the Sheinbein case changed when it began to
attract the attention of national political figures. 6 The affair entered
the realm of foreign policy and took on distinct international signifi-166
cance. In particular, the United States placed Israel's refusal to
grant its extradition request in the larger context of United States-
Israeli relations.
67
The Sheinbein case created a United States-Israeli diplomatic
quagmire for several reasons.' 68 First, because the two nations pos-
sess strong bilateral relations, the United States became quite disap-
pointed in Israel's refusal to extradite Sheinbein. 69 Second, Israel re-
ceives a tremendous amount of aid from the United States, 70 a large
Group File [hereinafter All Things Considered] (reflecting on the potential for dif-
ferent judicial treatment of minorities).
165. See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 14 (stating how the event extended beyond
local attention when it attracted members of Congress through coverage by the
Washington Post). Goldberg reports that former Chairman of the House Appro-
priations Committee Bob Livingston threatened to cut $500 million in aid to Israel
unless Israel sent Sheinbein home. See id.
166. See Dean, supra note 5 (providing a brief summary of how public outcry
placed the case in the international spotlight); see also Hockstader, supra note 28,
at Al (mentioning that the Sheinbein case is part of the diplomatic and political
realms because the United States provides massive amounts of aid to Israel).
167. See Nomi Bar-Yaacov, Israeli Supreme Court Bars Extradition of Teen
Murder Suspect to U.S., AGENCE FRANCE PREss, Feb. 25, 1999, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (stating how the United States might follow
through on its threat to withhold massive annual aid should Israel decide not to re-
turn Sheinbein). But see Goldberg, supra note 27, at 14 (asserting that the Shein-
bein affair is actually an example of strong, well-grounded United States-Israeli
relations).
168. See infra notes 169-73 and accompanying text (presenting several factors
that enabled the Sheinbein case to create tension between the United States and Is-
rael).
169. See Lush, supra note 29, at 3A, available in 1998 WL 5716318 (noting
Montgomery County State's Attorney Robert Dean's reaction to Israel's position).
Dean expressed feelings of surprise and disappointment due to the fact that Israel,
unlike a nation like Vietnam, maintains close relations with the United States. See
id.
170. See Hockstader, supra note 28, at Al (noting that, although Israel is the
world's top recipient of United States aid, United States lawyers, politicians, and
diplomats balked at the notion of shielding an American citizen from domestic
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portion of which is granted for military purposes."' Third, the Shein-
bein affair erupted simultaneously with other international dilemmas
facing the Israeli government. Israel not only had to cope with slowly
progressing Palestinian peace talks; but it also botched an assassina-
tion attempt on the leader of a militant Islamic group." Finally, the
denial of Sheinbein's extradition received the vehement reaction of
several powerful political minorities in the United States."'
As a result of the political climate surrounding the Sheinbein case,
the United States decided to exert political leverage in order to obtain
its extradition request."' Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, im-
mediately sent a letter to then Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu,
in which she formally requested cooperation from the Israeli gov-
ernment.' 75 Additionally, former Representative Robert Livingston,' "
then-Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, threatened
laws); see also Goldberg, supra note 27, at 14 (remarking that Israel receives ap-
proximately $3 billion in annual United States' aid); The Amnerican-Arab-Anti-
Discrimination Committee (ADQ) (visited June 7, 1999) <http://www.arabmedia.
com/98decdetained.html> [hereinafter ADC] (emphasizing that Israel receives an
enormous amount of aid from the United States).
171. See ADC, supra note 170 (noting that, of the aid Israel receives from the
United States, a large portion of it is for military purposes).
172. See Lippman & Gellman, supra note 23, at BI (describing the failed assas-
sination attempt on a Hamas leader by an Israeli agent).
173. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text (discussing outrage in the
Hispanic community at the Sheinbein decision); see also ADC, supra note 170
(expressing the strong reaction of Arab-Americans to Israel's refusal to grant ex-
tradition). Many Arab-Americans considered Israel's decision to be especially
egregious in light of the large number of Arabs imprisoned by Israeli authorities
and treated in an inhumane manner. See id.
174. See Bar-Yaacov, supra note 167 (explaining how the United States tried to
obtain extradition by threatening to withhold aid).
175. See Lippman & Gellman, supra note 23, at B1 (quoting Secretary of State
Albright's call for "maximum cooperation" from the Israeli government); see also
Vogel & Lippman, supra note 13 (reporting on the correspondence between the
Secretary of State and the Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu). Albright
directly appealed to Netanyahu to extradite Sheinbein. See id. Netanyahu re-
sponded that the crime appalled both the Israeli government and public, and that he
would return Sheinbein if possible under Israeli law. See id.
176. See Dan Balz & David Broder, RealiO, Meets Rhetoric On An Unpredict-
able Course For Nation, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1998, at A37 (discussing the ca-
lamitous end of Rep. Livingston's political career, and his abortive speakership).
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to withhold a substantial portion of foreign aid to Israel.'" Some
Congressmen supported Livingston's position' 7' in proposing a con-
current resolution calling for the extradition of the Maryland youth. 7"
The United States ultimately failed to achieve the desired result of
extraditing Sheinbein 8° Although the Prime Minister of Israel fa-
vored extradition,8 ' he was not willing to overstep his boundaries
and interfere with an autonomous judiciary. ' 2 Other Israeli officials
remained firm in their belief that, due to similarities between the two
judicial systems, a trial held in Israel would be equally fair and
jUt183
just. '8
177. See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 14 (relaying the sentiments of former Rep.
Livingston, who declared that he felt "violated" as a United States citizen by the
Sheinbein affair).
178. See id. (threatening that the United States could cut as much as $500 mil-
lion from Israeli aid); see also Kuttler et al., supra note 34, at 19 (noting that there
could be increased support among members of Congress if the Israeli government
does not provide a satisfactory response). But see id. at 19 (criticizing former Rep.
Livingston's assertions). Although Maryland Representative Constance Morella
pushed for the youth's return to the United States, she disagreed with Livingston's
desire to withhold aid because she felt the Israeli people had nothing to do with the
Sheinbein affair. See Andes, supra note 120.
179. See H.R. Con. Res. 165, 105th Cong. (1997) (clamoring for Israel to grant
extradition for Samuel Sheinbein and to have the murder trial take place in Mont-
gomery County, Maryland).
180. See Internight: Analysis: Israeli Supreme Court Rules American Teen Ac-
cused of Murder in U.S. Will Not Be Tried in Israel (NBC television broadcast,
Feb. 26, 1999) (quoting Israeli Ambassador Zilman Shoval). Shoval stated: "I feel
for the [Tello] family. But the family can rest assured that if Sheinbein is found
guilty, he will be punished severely." Id.
181. See Kuttler et al., supra note 34, at 1 (disclosing Netanyahu's desire to see
the suspect extradited).
182. See id. (providing the Prime Minister's position on the independence and
autonomy of the Israeli judiciary and how, in a country of law, this autonomy must
be preserved). The Foreign Ministry stated:
The decisions of the Supreme Court are, of course, completely autonomous in
the framework of complete respect for the principle of the separation of pow-
ers. Israel believes that the American public and its Leaders, in recognition of,
and out of respect for our common values, will understand that the decision is
proper.
Id. The Israeli government emphasized that the decision was not political, but
rather a legal one. See Bar-Yaacov, supra note 167.
183. See All Things Considered, supra note 164 (asserting that, while an Israeli
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Even though many Israelis feared that their nation would become a
haven for fugitives,4 they also expressed outrage at the official
United States position that encouraged extradition.'" Many Israeli
leaders considered American threats inappropriate and unneces-
sary. '6 Furthermore, they felt that the United States' position ran
contrary to its own interests.'87 In addition to Israeli disapproval of
the United States' reactionary measures, both Jewish and non-Jewish
observers pointed out the hypocritical nature of the United States'
position.' In spite of this backlash, it appears that United States
pressure on Israel influenced the Israeli Parliament." Accordingly,
on April 19, 1999, the Knesset' 90 amended its extradition law to avoid
punishment may differ from a United States punishment, the Israeli justice system
ensures fairness through the use of fundamental rules such as cross-examination).
184. See Goell, supra note 162, at 8 (arguing that the Israeli Supreme Court de-
cision is detrimental to Israel because of the way in which it serves as a protection
for criminals).
185. See Andes, supra note 120, at A9 (highlighting the reaction of some Jewish
leaders to American threats to withhold aid).
186. See id. (commenting on the United States' "hasty threats" and how its
views seem narrowly-focused); see also Lippman & Gellman, supra note 23, at B 1
(remarking that only people with other agendas would use the Sheinbein affair
against Israel).
187. See Andes, supra note 120, at A9 (arguing that United States' aid to Israel
displays a commitment to supporting the Jewish State).
188. See Steve Lubet, The Accused v. International Law, CHi. TRIB., Mar. 18,
1999, available in 1999 WL 2847540 (asserting that Israel's extradition ruling is
understandable when considered in light of United States refusals to give up their
own citizens for trial in foreign tribunals); see also Nitsana Darshan-Leitner, Dou-
ble Standard, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 2, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (commenting on how the United States placed pressure on Israeli
authorities, but chose not to do the same with Palestinian leaders, who have con-
tinuously protected terrorists suspected of taking part in the murders of American
citizens).
189. See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 14 (explaining former Rep. Livingston's
attempts to financially pressure Israel); see also Vogel & Lippman, supra note 175
and accompanying text (relating Secretary of State Albright's diplomatic efforts to
favorably resolve the Sheinbein matter in line with the best interests of the United
States).
190. See Kraft, supra note 3 (discussing the Knesset's recent enactment of an
extradition law, which stipulates that non-resident Israeli citizens will be extra-
dited, tried, and sentenced abroad, and returned to Israel to serve their sentences).
2000]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
future Sheinbein-like situations.' 9'
IV. THE DETRIMENTAL IMPACT ON AMERICAN
JUSTICE
One of the most problematic issues surrounding the Sheinbein
case is the potential undermining of the United States' interest in en-
suring that Sheinbein's sentence matches the severity of his crime. 2
While other evidentiary and procedural problems would have existed
in the event of a trial,'93 Sheinbein's plea-bargain and subsequent
conviction rendered these concerns moot. It is still important, how-
ever, to address the foregoing concerns and to illustrate some of the
problems other nations could encounter in seeking international co-
operation in the foreign prosecution of fugitives.
A. MARYLAND OFFICIALS' PREVIOUS PROSECUTORIAL CONCERNS
The refusal to extradite raises problems in transporting witnesses
and evidence to the host country to conduct a trial.' 94 If the Sheinbein
case would have resulted in a trial, officials in Montgomery County
could have faced many procedural inconveniences.' 9 Maryland
prosecutors in the Sheinbein case would have had to send a tremen-
dous amount of documentation and evidence to Israel, as the scene of
the crime, the evidence, and the witnesses were all located on
191. See id. (noting that the Knesset amended Israel's anti-extradition law,
largely as a result of the United States' anger and frustration with Israel's handling
of the Sheinbein case).
192. See infra notes 207-16 and accompanying text (discussing the various sen-
tencing issues that accompanied the Sheinbein case, including his plea bargain, the
pre-trial sentencing agreement between Israeli prosecutors and his attorneys, and
the effects of the Israeli prison system on his sentence).
193. See infra notes 194-206 and accompanying text (addressing problems that
would have plagued Maryland officials had the Sheinbein case gone to trial).
194. See Abramovsky, supra note 2, at 1915 (emphasizing that the transporta-
tion of witnesses and evidence to the place of trial are some of the most difficult
problems arising in foreign prosecutions). Evidence located abroad and admitted at
trial requires prior international certification. See id. In addition, there are far more
stringent security and licensing procedures that accompany the transportation of
physical evidence abroad. See id.
195. See id. (providing examples of joint United States-Israeli prosecutions
where the gathering of evidence posed problems for prosecutors).
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American soil. 96 In addition, Maryland prosecutors would have had
to contend with sending numerous witnesses to Israel.' 9' In spite of
the importance of these witnesses to the prosecution, however, Israel
could not have compelled these witnesses to fly there to testify.'"
These logistical and procedural problems enabled Sheinbein's attor-
ney to successfully delay his arraignment hearing."
Equally problematic are the many obstacles preventing authorities
in different countries from effectively working together to prosecute
the accused . In the Sheinbein case, Maryland authorities asserted
that Israeli prosecutors did not sufficiently comprehend the facts of
the case 20' and that the Israeli prosecutors did not take the case seri-
196. See Shaver & Plushnick-Masti, supra note 38, at B!I (noting that Maryland
prosecutors flew all paperwork and photographs to Israel in order to provide the
defense with all of the necessary information).
197. See Sheinbein Charged in Tel Aviv with First-Degree Murder, JERUSALEM
PosT, Mar. 23, 1999, at 5, available in 1999 WL 9000950 (reporting that twenty-
four of twenty-five potential witnesses are American and would therefore need to
fly to Israel); see also Michael Janofsky, Not-Guilty Plea in Slaving a Surprise to
Family and Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1999, at A 16 available in LEXIS, News
Library, NYT File (highlighting a possible difference in the trial proceedings if the
case took place in the United States). Maryland prosecutors contend that they
would have called more than eighty witnesses had the trial taken place on Ameri-
can soil. See id.
198. See Abramovsky, supra note 2, at 1916 (discussing an Israeli Supreme
Court ruling that an Israeli court can not subpoena a foreign witness); see also
Howard Schneider & Katherine Shaver, Sheinbein Doesn 't Admit to Killing,
WASH. POST, July 6, 1999, at Al (noting that none of the potential witnesses have
to fly to Israel). Coupled with this obstacle is that Israeli law does not require
Sheinbein's parents or siblings to testify against him. See id.
199. See Shaver & Plushnick-Masti, supra note 38, at BI (stating that Shein-
bein's defense attorney, David Libai, sought a delay in Sheinbein's arraignment
because he did not receive all of the information that the Montgomery County,
Maryland prosecutors had gathered in their investigation); see also Shaver &
Plushnick-Masti, supra note 38, at B I (discussing Libai's successful request for a
second delay in the arraignment).
200. See infra notes 201-06 and accompanying text (describing the ways in
which prosecutors are limited in foreign prosecutions).
201. See Schneider & Shaver, supra note 198, at BI (noting that the Israeli in-
dictment contains various factual inconsistencies and other errors, signaling to
Maryland prosecutors that the Israeli prosecutors do not have a full understanding
of the case against Sheinbein); see also Janofsky, supra note 197 (reflecting the
opinion of State's Attorney Gansler, who stated that Israeli prosecutors only have
"passing familiarity" with the details because all of the evidence and witnesses are
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ously. °2 In spite of Israel's intentions to cooperate with United States
officials, language difficulties also frustrated Maryland prosecutors,
as many of the documents were written in Hebrew and the Israeli
prosecutor spoke little English. 03 Furthermore, although the trial was
to be conducted in Hebrew, the defendant and the witnesses only
spoke English.2°  Finally, other characteristics of the Israeli judicial
system could have altered the outcome of the trial. °S For example,
under Israeli law, Sheinbein's confession to his brother and father




202. See Shaver & Plushnick-Masti, supra note 38 (commenting on Maryland
prosecutors' frustration over the perceived indifference of Israeli officials). But see
Irit Kohn, The Sheinbein Delay, WASH. POST, July 8, 1999, at A24, available in
1999 WL 17012967 (arguing that Israeli prosecutors took the Sheinbein case seri-
ously and gave the case the attention it deserved).
203. See Janofsky, supra note 197, at 16 (stating that Gansler's main objective
was to help Israeli prosecutor Hadassah Naor build a case against Sheinbein, which
was made more problematic by insufficient funds, language barriers, and geo-
graphical distance).
204. See Sheinbein: A Murder in Maryland Should Bring Trial in Marland/obr
a Defendant Who is a Marylander, BALT. SUN, Mar. 2, 1999, at 12A, available in
1999 WL 5174463 (characterizing Sheinbein's case as a "strange proceeding,"
comprised of witnesses and a defendant who do not speak Hebrew, the language of
the trial).
205. See Abramovsky, supra note 2, at 1912-13 (detailing some of the ways in
which Israel's justice system differs from that of the United States). In the Israeli
court system, there are no jury trials. See id. There are aspects of the Israeli legal
system, however, that could potentially benefit United States officials. See
Abramovsky, supra note 2, at 1912-13. In the Israeli legal system, for example, the
prosecution may use a suspect's unwillingness to testify to strengthen its case
against him. See id. at 1913-14. The State can also appeal an acquittal, a marked
divergence from the United States' judicial system. See id.
206. See Schneider & Shaver, supra note 198, at Al (stating that Israeli law
would protect a confession given by Sheinbein to family members); see also CNN
Burden of Proof: Samuel Sheinbein to Plead Guilty: Will Israeli Justice Suit the
Crime? (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 25, 1999), available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary [hereinafter Burden] (discussing Israel's parental privilege that would pre-
vent Israeli prosecutors from forcing Sol Sheinbein to testify against his son).
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B. SENTENCING PROBLEMS: WILL THE ISRAELI PUNISHMENT FIT
AN AMERICAN CRIME?
The difficulty of conducting a trial ceased to be a concern for
Maryland prosecutors ' 7 when, as a result of a plea bargain,:"' an Is-
raeli court convicted Sheinbein of premeditated murder. : ' Although
satisfied with this conviction, the issue of sentencing still troubled
Maryland officials.10 First, although Sheinbein was sentenced to
serve twenty-four years in an Israeli prison,2" United States prose-
cutors asserted that an American court would have likely sentenced
him to life in prison without parole. ' Second, officials were con-
cerned that he would only serve sixteen years of his sentence and that
he would be released from prison when he turned thirty-three years
207. See Guilty Plea, supra note 41 (noting that Sheinbein's plea bargain per-
mitted Maryland officials to avoid the "logistical nightmare" that would have
arisen if they had to transport witnesses and evidence to Israel).
208. See Steve Twomey & Steven Gray, Sheinbein to Plead Guilty in Israel,
WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 23299850 (reporting
that Sheinbein agreed to plead guilty to murder and to serve twenty-four years in
an Israeli prison); see also William A. Orme Jr., Israel Convicts U.S. Teenager
After He Admits to Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1999, at A 16, available in
LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (describing how judges did not feel bound by the
agreement reached between Israeli prosecutors and Sheinbein's lawyers).
209. See Orme, supra note 208 (noting that, after Sheinbein admitted to the
murder of Tello, the Israeli court convicted him of premeditated murder).
210. See CBS, infra note 212 (explaining Gansler's incredulity at the leniency of
the Israeli penal system in comparison to the tougher sentencing guidelines of its
American counterpart).
211. See Hockstader & Whitlock, supra note 13, at B1 (commenting that an Is-
raeli court sentenced Sheinbein to 24 years in prison, which, according to Israeli
prosecutors, is a severe punishment under Israeli law), see also Heidi J. Gleit,
Sheinbein Convicted of Murder, JERUSALEM POST. Sept. 3, 1999, at 4A, available
in LEXIS, News Library, JPost File (stating that Sheinbein's attorneys and the Is-
raeli prosecutors recommended to the Israeli court that Sheinbein serve a 24 year
prison term). Although the court, in fact, sentenced Sheinbein to 24 years in prison,
he only had 22 years left to serve because his sentence ran from the day of his ar-
rest in 1997. See Hockstader & Whitlock, supra note 13, at B 1.
212. See CBS, supra note 16 (opining that Sheinbein would have been convicted
in the United States and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole); see also Hockstader & Whitlock, supra note 13, at BI (providing Gan-
sler's opinion that Sheinbein's sentence paled in comparison to what he would
have received in the United States).
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old. " Third, after only a few years in prison, Sheinbein could receive
the benefit of weekend furloughs, a common Israeli sentencing pro-
vision allowing an inmate to take a temporary, supervised leave of
absence from prison.1 4 Finally, Israeli prison conditions differ from
those in the United States and provide for more liberal treatment of
prisoners. 215 For instance, while United States prisons have small
cells with minimal time permitted outdoors, Israeli prisons provide a
216more open, campus-like setting.
While Maryland officials were less than pleased with the possibil-
ity that Sheinbein could serve a significantly lesser sentence in Is-
rael,1 7 the plea agreement was not a complete miscarriage of jus-
tice.1 From an Israeli perspective, Sheinbein's sentence actually
213. See Guilty Plea, supra note 207 (expressing concerns over the fact that
Sheinbein could be out of prison in the year 2013 at the age of 33, after serving
only 16 years of his sentence). In Israel, it is common for prisoners to serve only
two-thirds of their sentences. See Ethan Bronner, Israelis Defend Plea Bargain
With American, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1999, at A13, available in LEXIS, News
Library, NYT File. It is also common for murderers who are sentenced to life to
serve substantially lesser sentences. See No Leniency For Murderers, JERUSALEM
POST, Aug. 27, 1999, at 8A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(commenting that murderers who receive a life sentence can go free after serving
only 15 years in prison). But see Hockstader & Whitlock, supra note 13, at BI
(quoting Georgetown Law Professor Jonathan Strum, who asserted that the sensi-
tivity of the Israeli parole board to this case makes it unlikely that they will ap-
prove parole or furloughs for Sheinbein upon eligibility).
214. See Guilty Plea, supra note 41 (noting that prisoners in Israel may obtain
weekend and holiday furloughs). Because Israeli law allows furloughs after a pris-
oner serves one quarter of his sentence, Sheinbein will be eligible in four years.
See Twomey & Gray, supra note 208, at Al; see also Hockstader & Whitlock, su-
pra note 13, at BI (noting that Sheinbein will be eligible to apply for 24 to 96 hour
furloughs in 2003). Before considering Sheinbein for furloughs or parole, however,
Israeli officials will take into account several factors, including the severity of the
crime, the potential danger he poses to others, and his behavior in prison. See id.
215. See Flight to Israel, supra note 15 (comparing the prison conditions in the
United States and Israel).
216. See id. (describing the campus-like setting of Israeli prisons, where prison-
ers may roam the grounds, sunbathe, and play sports). One prisoner commented
that the prison was a "beautiful place," in which one had "everything." See id.
217. See supra notes 207-16 (setting forth the reasons why Maryland officials
were concerned with the sentencing possibilities arising from Sheinbein's plea
bargain agreement).
218. See infra notes 219-21 (providing two reasons why Sheinbein's sentence,
although problematic, is not wholly unjust).
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appears to be quite harsh. ' 9 Both sentences and plea-bargain ar-
rangements for minors are typically shorter in Israel than in the
United States.220 Further, if Sheinbein were ever to decide to leave Is-
rael, he would expose himself to the possibility of a trial in the
United States."'
V. RECOMMENDATIONS: THE NEW ISRAELI
LEGISLATION AND CURRENT ALTERNATIVES
Following Israel's refusal to extradite Sheinbein, the Knesset
passed a new extradition law that enables Israel to extradite its citi-
zens under certain circumstances.2 The law provides for the extra-
219. See Guilty Plea, supra note 41 (arguing that a 24 year sentence for a minor
such as Sheinbein is severe under Israeli standards); see also Hockstader & Wit-
lock, supra note 13, at B1 (quoting the Israeli court's opinion, which stated that
Sheinbein deserved a "severe and deterring punishment" taking into consideration
his age and the severity of his crime); Twomey & Gray, supra note 208, at AI (as-
serting that Sheinbein's sentence, if served, would be the harshest sentence ever
imposed on a minor by the Israeli Supreme Court). Harvard University Law Pro-
fessor Alan Dershowitz commented that Sheinbein should have returned for trial in
the United States where the potential for a lighter sentence would have been
greater. See Dan Izenberg & Yitzhak Ben-Horin, Rubinstein Defends Sheinbein
Plea Bargain Agreement, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 26, 1999, at 1, available in
LEXIS, News Library, JPost File (paraphrasing Israeli Attorney General Elyakim
Rubinstein, who commented that, while some jurisdictions have relatively strict
penalties, several jurisdictions in the United States sentence convicted murderers to
similar terms).
220. See Izenberg & Ben-Horin, supra note 219, at AI (pointing out that both
plea-bargain arrangements and verdicts for minors are typically lighter sentences).
221. See Guilty Plea, supra note 41 (stating that Sheinbein could be tried and
sentenced in the United States because Sheinbein's indictment in Maryland is still
in effect).
222. See Kraft, supra note 3, at 2 (commenting on the Knesset's decision to
change its law). Kraft also described the Knesset's concern over the Sheinbein
controversy and how the new law could prevent similar situations from arising in
the future. See id. Many Knesset members did not envision that someone like
Sheinbein would hide behind its anti-extradition laws. See id. Yosef Harish, a for-
mer Attorney General, felt that there was "no reason someone with no connection
to Israel could flee justice in their country and find a haven there." Id. Hans Porat,
head of the Knesset Constitution and Law Committee, argued that Israel's extradi-
tion policy impaired any effort to seek criminal cooperation from other countries.
See Matthew Kalman, Israel Amends Law: Let's Non-residents be Ertradited
Won't Apply to U.S. Teenager Who Fled to Avoid Murder Prosecution in Mary-
land, USA TODAY, Apr. 19, 1999, at 11 A, available in 1999 WL 6840218.
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dition of Israeli citizens who are not residents, whereas those who are
residents of Israel will face a trial abroad and serve their sentences at
home."3 In cases where a suspect is not an Israeli resident at the time
of the crime and has since become a resident, the law provides that
extradition is conditioned on allowing the accused to return to Israel
for sentencing and punishment.2 4 In response to this change in Israeli
law, some members of Congress lauded Israel as a leader within the
international community."5 Although this amendment to Israel's ex-
tradition law may be the most viable alternative, other recent and
controversial alternatives nonetheless warrant discussion.
A. AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
When attempting to mitigate some of the problems associated with
the non-extradition of nationals, countries could consider several al-
127ternatives. Matters relating to extradition could be placed in the
hands of an international criminal tribunal. 8 Such a tribunal, how-
223. See Kraft, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing the way in which the new law will
apply to Israeli citizens); see also Kalman, supra note 222, at I IA (describing the
way that the new Israeli law would distinguish between citizens who are residents
and those who are not).
224. See Laurie Copans, Extradition Request Tests Israeli Law, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, July 30, 1999, at A12, available in 1999 WL 5362369 (discussing the
provisions behind the new Israeli law and how these provisions treat Israeli citi-
zens who are not residents differently from citizens who are residents).
225. See Kevin Brady, Rep. Brady Praises Israel's Knesset Regarding New Ex-
tradition Law, FED. Doc. CLEARING HOUSE, Apr. 22, 1999, available in 1999 WL
2223489 (remarking that Israel's decision to change its law was a positive step to-
wards eliminating safe havens for criminals and updating out of date extradition
laws). Not surprisingly, the change in extradition law arose out of concern for
damaged United States-Israeli relations. See Collins, supra note 22, at 6 (explain-
ing Israeli concerns that the Sheinbein case had damaged relations with the United
States and disrupted a formula for seeking justice); see also Kraft, supra note 3, at
2 (discussing Israeli sentiment about the importance of preserving United States-
Israeli relations).
226. See infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text (setting forth recommenda-
tions explaining why the amended legislation provides the most feasible means of
remedying future extradition disputes).
227. See infra notes 228-43 (providing alternative measures which nations can
use to resolve the struggle that occurs over extraditing nationals who are fugitives
from justice).
228. See Gilbert, supra note 148, at 156-57 (discussing the use of an interna-
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ever, might not achieve the desired goal of extraditing fugitives be-
cause States often unilaterally interpret their international obligations
to a tribunal. 229 Thus, a nation that refuses to extradite under the cur-
tional criminal court to prosecute offenders). Gilbert references the use of an inter-
national criminal court in the context of the political offense exception to extradi-
tion, where nations refuse to extradite an individual based on the defense that the
crime was driven by political motivations. See id. at 113-15. 156-57; see also Mi-
chael Plachta, Non-Extradition of Nationals: A Neverending Story?, 13 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 77, 150 (1999) (asserting that a criminal tribunal may be the best
way to resolve extradition matters due to the neutrality of the court); hi. at 1 51-52
(pointing to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as an
example of a model for extraditing criminals through the use of a tribunal). Under
the Yugoslavia tribunal, all States must take "'any measures necessary under their
domestic law to implement" the terms of the tribunal's statute and resolution. See
id. at 152 (citing Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Per-
sons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Com-
mitted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, UN Doc. S/25704,
Annex (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993)). In addition, States must com-
ply with orders issued by a Trial Chamber, including orders for the arrest of per-
sons and the surrender or transfer of persons to the Tribunal. See i. Plachta, how-
ever, questions whether the tribunals should exceed traditional extradition treaty
limitations and asserts that States should be assured that they will not be compelled
to depart from fundamental principles of their domestic legal systems. See i0. at
153. In general, however, the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia stands for the no-
tion that international standards can provide for more utility when attempting to
resolve crimes committed by transnational offenders. See GEOFF GILBERT,
TRANSNATIONAL FUGITIVE OFFENDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 409 (1998).
Gilbert comments:
The establishment of ad hoc tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
and the preparations for an International Criminal Court mean that transna-
tional fugitive offenders accused of certain specific offences generally associ-
ated with armed conflict are now to be dealt with under the closest approxi-
mation so far to truly international criminal law, rather than through the
domestic application of norms drawn up by the international community in
the wake of international armed conflicts.
Id. at 409. For further discussion on the two recent ad hoc tribunals of Rwanda and
the Former Yugoslavia, see generally id. at 407-29 (providing a brief history of
international tribunals as well as a lengthy analysis of the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda tribunals).
229. See Plachta, supra note 228, at 154 (claiming that States sometimes unilat-
erally determine the extent of their cooperative obligations to the Yugoslavia Tri-
bunal, in turn producing inconsistent results with respect to surrendering or trans-
ferring their nationals to the Tribunal). This situation arises when a nation's
constitution contains an anti-extradition provision. See id. The constitutions of
Croatia, Germany, and Poland, for example, all contain such a provision. See id. at
155.
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rent system might not be any more likely to do so under order from
an international court.230 Further, many nations could consider an in-
ternational tribunal to be in violation of their national sovereignty,
thereby lessening the chances that they disregard their own internal
responsibilities and defer to international standards."'
An international criminal tribunal could prove successful, how-
ever, by fostering neutrality in extradition and possibly defusing po-
litically charged cases like Sheinbein's.32 A tribunal could also cre-
ate fairness and consistency in the proceedings, leaving minimal
room for legal interpretation between the receiving and sending na-
tions.233 For the more controversial issues, such as where the individ-
230. See Kai I. Rebane, Note, Extradition and Individual Rights: The Need for
An International Criminal Court To Safeguard Individual Rights, 19 FORDIIAM
INT'L L.J. 1636, 1677-78 (1996) (presenting the argument that a tribunal would be
ineffective because countries would still have numerous concerns regarding the
partiality of judges, elements of politicization, and the exclusion of domestic inter-
ests). The problem of domestic interpretation of international law stands for the
more general proposition that, in many instances, international standards are inca-
pable of solving regional problems. See id.
231. See id. at 1676-77 (asserting that an international court would interfere with
a nation's right to prosecute crimes domestically). "Opponents of an ICC believe
that domestic laws and decisions should be free from the interference of outside
international bodies. Each nation must be able to control and protect its own citi-
zens, allowing other nations to determine their own internal responsibilities." Id. at
1677. Ironically, the United States put forth a similar position when it recently re-
fused to sign the International Criminal Court Treaty due to concerns that the
Court would be used as a political tool, bringing prosecutions against those who
participated in controversial peacekeeping efforts internationally. See The Interna-
tional Criminal Court vs. The American People, Heritage Foundation Reports, Feb.
5, 1999, at 1 available in LEXIS, News Library. There was also the argument that
United States participation would violate the Constitution "because it would sub-
ject individual Americans to trial and punishment in an extra-constitutional court
without affording them all of the rights and protections the Constitution guaran-
tees." Id. As a result of these concerns, the United States tried to implement several
strategies that would ensure the non-extradition of its nationals should the Interna-
tional Criminal Court come into effect. See Farhan Haq, Rights: U.S. Skirts
Authority of International Criminal Court, Inter Press Serv., May 31, 1999 avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library.
232. See Rebane, supra note 230, at 1672-73 (discussing how governments re-
fusing to extradite certain individuals to the United States could use an interna-
tional criminal tribunal so as not to infuriate United States officials and avoid the
appearance of choosing a side in an extradition dispute).
233. See id. at 1674 (asserting that a tribunal would provide a neutral forum in
which nations could no longer fear the prospect of an unfair trial). A tribunal could
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ual will serve his sentence,' the tribunal could use a case-by-case
analysis. In the present case, for example, a tribunal could have es-
tablished that the United States try and sentence Sheinbein, but that
the accused serves his sentence in Israel. Such a ruling could have
stricken a compromise between the two nations and prevented any
further political and international tension over the Sheinbein case.
In sum, however, the criminal tribunal is a weak alternative be-
cause reliance on an international agreement increases the chances
that Israel could assert its own interpretation of the proper extradition
standard.23 Furthermore, based on the strength of its historical and
cultural roots, as -well as the interests of individual life and national
sovereignty that are at stake, there is strong reason to believe that
countries such as Israel will continue to defend the non-extradition of
nationals, regardless of international standards.:"
B. THE ABDUCTION OF FUGITIVES: A CONTROVERSIAL
ALTERNATIVE
Another method of handling the non-extradition of nationals is the
extremely controversial practice of abducting fugitives from other
countries.' The United States Supreme Court has ruled that abduc-
also provide a relatively uniform system of rules, thereby eliminating some of the
questions that accompany extradition disputes. See id.
234. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 345 (discussing the dis-
agreement between the United States and Israel over the location of Sheinbein's
sentencing because of the possibility of discrimination and unfairness in the United
States prison system).
235. See Rebane, supra note 230 (discussing the likelihood that nations will in-
terpret their international obligations in accordance with domestic needs).
236. See Plachta, supra note 228, at 155-56 (noting the possibility that conces-
sions by other governments in the non-extradition of nationals will not necessarily
reflect universal changes in this area). The author also expresses concerns that: "to
the uncompromised protagonists of the existing system, an exception for the inter-
national court, if made at all, may become a powerful argument to claim that the
opposite-that is, non-extradition of nationals-is still a rule, and, as such, has re-
mained valid." Id.
237. See Paul Hoffman et al., Kidnapping Foreign Criminal Suspects, 15
WHITIER L. REV. 419, 420-30 (1994) (detailing the controversial aspects of inter-
national criminal abduction). Abduction is defined as an activity "carried out by
agents of one state acting under color of law who unlawfully seize a person within
the jurisdiction of another state and deliver that person to the state seeking him."
BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 219. Interwoven with international abduction, how-
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tion is an acceptable means of obtaining fugitives who flee to other
nations and that the practice is not in violation of international law.'21
Many nations and experts, however, view the kidnapping of fugitives
as a violation of national sovereignty.239 Furthermore, academics and
leaders in the international community consider abduction to be a se-
rious violation of human rights.24° As a result, the kidnapping of fu-
gitives would make nations such as Israel even less likely to cooper-
ate with United States officials in future extradition cases.24' Thus,
although the practice of kidnapping would serve the punitive inter-
ests of the United States, it would fail to address Israel's concerns of
unjust prosecution on American soil242 and unfair treatment of its na-
tionals by other countries.243
C. ISRAEL'S NEW LEGISLATION
Despite the existence of these alternatives, the change in Israel's
ever, are the issues of sovereignty and human rights. See id.; see also Hoffman et
al., supra, at 429-35 (discussing human rights as an aspect of international abduc-
tions). An individual possesses a basic right not to be removed from her country
without due process. See id. at 430. Moreover, a nation's sovereignty may be of-
fended when another State's officers enter the State and exercise its police powers.
See id.
238. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 660-70 (1992) (as-
serting that the international agreement between the United States and Mexico
does not prohibit the kidnapping of fugitives). But see id. at 679 (Stevens, Black-
mun, and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (expressing strong disapproval of the major-
ity's assertions that international abduction is acceptable). Writing for the dissent-
ers, Justice Stevens opined, "[i]t is shocking that a party to an extradition treaty
might believe that it has secretly reserved the right to make seizures of citizens in
the other party's territory." Id. Bassiouni asserts that the United States typically
resorted to practices like abduction to avoid the traditional problems associated
with extradition. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 245.
239. See Spector, supra note 77, at 1007 (stating the Mexican policy of refusing
to extradite its nationals).
240. See Hoffman et al., supra note 237, at 430-35 (providing arguments that
international abduction violates human rights).
241. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 325-28 (explaining the long
and sordid history of United States sanctioned kidnapping, which has sullied rela-
tions with other nations).
242. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 331 (discussing the Israeli
concern that Sheinbein would be treated unfairly and inhumanely in America).
243. See supra notes 135-36 (noting Israel's concerns of unfair treatment by
other nations' legal systems).
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extradition law is likely the most effective means of serving both
American and Israeli interests. 2 4 First, the law does not rely on inter-
national agreement. Rather, the law derives its force from domestic
political reform, thereby mitigating the chances that Israel will vio-
late its own law.245 Second, Israel has an increased incentive to
change its extradition law because many victims of crimes commit-
ted by Jews or Israelis are themselves Jews or Israelis. :' Finally, Is-
rael recently displayed a willingness to follow its new extradition
law, strengthening the efficacy of this legislative change.:4
Although Israel's new extradition law represents a positive step
for international criminal extradition, the law contains several
flaws.248 From the United States' perspective, the law is ineffective
because it does not apply retroactively to Sheinbein." Second, the
law would still allow Israeli nationals who are residents to serve their
244. See supra notes 194-216 and accompanying text (outlining potential United
States' concerns with Sheinbein's trial and sentence taking place in Israel); supra
notes 129-36, 154-64 and accompanying text (discussing the numerous concerns
that Israel could have over the possibility of an Israeli citizen being tried and sen-
tenced in the United States).
245. See Petkunas, supra note 22, at 228 (arguing that any agreements reached
between the United States and Israel would carry little weight and that Israel can
only fulfill international obligations through internal political reform); see also
Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 346 (stating that extradition is as much
about domestic politics as it is about international treaties).
246. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 1, at 343 (providing a way in
which United States officials could convince Israeli authorities to change their ex-
tradition law in order to obtain cooperation). The United States argued this point to
successfully convince the Dominican Republic to allow for the extradition of Do-
minican nationals. See id. The Dominican Republic had previously banned extra-
dition and refused to cooperate with United States extradition requests. See hiL
247. See Dan Izenberg, Justice Officials Ask Court Approval to Ertradite Citizen
to US, JERUSALEM POST, July 30, 1999, at 2A, available in 1999 WL 9006461
(discussing the Israeli government's use of a recently approved amendment to the
extradition law to extradite an individual to the United States for cheating a dozen
elderly people out of $185,000).
248. See ififra notes 249-51 (discussing defects in the new extradition law).
249. See Kalman, supra note 222, at I1 A (noting that the Israeli legislation
would not apply to Sheinbein). It is important to note, however, that the United
States itself does not allow laws to apply retroactively, making it problematic to
expect these types of legislative changes from other nations. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,
sec. 9, cl. 3 (establishing that no ex post facto laws shall be passed in the United
States).
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sentences in Israel. In this regard, it is conceivable that an Israeli
resident could leave the country, commit a violent crime abroad, and
then return to his homeland in order to prevent punishment in a for-
eign land."'
The new law could be equally problematic from an Israeli per-
spective. First, there is still some ambiguity as to how the law would
apply to those who have lived in Israel for a long time, but are not
212citizens.2 Second, there is the concern that other countries could
view this amendment to the extradition law as a sign of weakness
and shame. 253 Although these concerns are legitimate, Israel, as a na-
tion, should be satisfied that the amendment constitutes a positive
step towards compromise in international criminal matters. Further,
Israel will be able to shed the image of being a safe-haven for fugi-
tives while ensuring that those with the strongest national ties serve
their sentences in their homeland. Finally, Israel significantly lessens
the chances that it will further damage precious bilateral relations
with countries like the United States.
CONCLUSION
It is noteworthy that even on American soil, a conviction and a
life sentence in the Sheinbein case would not have been certain. This
doubt, however, does not distract from the anger and frustration felt
in the wake of the Israeli Supreme Court's ruling. Officials in the
United States are still troubled by the idea that American citizens can
commit crimes on American soil and then use the extradition laws of
250. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text (explaining that the law
would allow citizens who are residents to return to Israel to serve their sentence,
while non-residents would be eligible for extradition).
251. See Schachar, supra note 49, at 266 (asserting that an individual can retain
Israeli citizenship status even if he or she chooses to live outside of Israel for an
extended period of time).
252. See Collins, supra note 22, at 6 (presenting concerns about whether or not
the law would apply to non-citizens). Ruby Rivlin of the Likud political party ex-
pressed concern that the amendment would affect people who "come to live [in Is-
rael] for a long time but are not citizens." Id.
253. See id. (reporting that a Knesset member opposed the amendment because
"[o]nly a shameful government could support deporting Jews."). Moreover, Justice
Minister Tzahi Hanegbi criticized the amendment as "staining the books of legis-
lation with a law extraditing Jews." Id.
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another country as a safe-haven from prosecution in the United
States. Further, despite Israel's legislative changes to ameliorate con-
cerns about extradition, members of Tello's family will never forget
this gross injustice. Consequently, the legacy of Samuel Sheinbein
will continue to plague the United States, as well as the international
community.
As the world grows increasingly interdependent, however, it is
vital that nations such as Israel compromise and serve as an example
for other nations still refusing to cooperate in the resolution of inter-
national criminal matters. It is also necessary that as trade, human
rights, and other international laws and standards evolve, extradition
laws follow suit. Otherwise, outdated extradition laws will be unable
to adjust to the new and changing international environment, ulti-
mately forcing countries like the United States to resort to alternative
and more drastic means in resolving extradition disputes.
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